Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, General: Economic and Political Matters, Volume I, Part 2

460.509/6–2554: Telegram

The United States Special Representative in Europe (Hughes) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Paris, June 25, 1954—7 p.m.

Polto 2155. Eyes only for the Secretary and Stassen; for Merchant, Waugh, Anderson (Commerce) and Hensel (Defense).

1. I have been fully briefed on character and outcome of trilateral EWT talks just concluded Paris, as well as on extensive “postmortem” conversation between U.S. and U.K. CG Dels.

2. U.K. Del came into these talks, as had been urged by Stassen and USDel, with a negotiating brief very flexible in comparison with previous U.K. positions. U.K. CG Del has said privately that full scope of U.K. brief was “nowhere near disclosed” during talks; and, if necessary, he would urge on London “a settlement going appreciably beyond his present instructions”.

3. On other hand, USDel came to talks with very rigid instructions which represented only marginal departures from most recent U.S. positions stated in COCOM (indeed, in some cases significant departures in a direction tending away from any possibility of compromise).

4. French position stated in talks was mostly repetition of previously stated French views on individual items; but Charpentier told Harpham and Loftus privately that in interest of Western unity he would undertake obtain French concurrence for any negotiated settlement U.S. and U.K. could work out.

5. I appreciate that decision to issue such rigid instructions to USDel was taken, at least in general terms, by NSC; and that adoption of a “tough line” with respect to residual disagreed items (many of which are genuinely “hard core”) has much to be said for it in terms of both security considerations and political considerations.

6. Nevertheless these problems must be assessed in perspective with other (and I think more important) matters at issue between U.S. and U.K. Govts. Major U.S./U.K. rift over EWT policy could be harmful in itself and prejudicial these other issues.

7. U.S./U.K. agreement cannot be achieved by ultimatum. Complete U.K. capitulation (i.e., acceptance of U.S. ultimatum for solution remaining disagreements entirely on U.S. terms) is impossible; U.K. action on transaction controls over presently agreed list plus all disagreed embargo items is impossible. Equally, U.S. capitulation (i.e., acceptance of degree of decontrol thus far agreed but without U.K. action on transaction controls) is impossible.

8. Given these imperatives, we seem to be heading for failure at July 8–9 CG meeting. No matter how inability to achieve agreement at CG might be glossed over the U.S./U.K. rift will be evident with resultant demoralizing impact on COCOM itself which is already shaken by its failures achieve agreement in important fields of shipping controls and transit shipments. The disposition toward cooperative action on EWT matters, already at a low ebb, will be still further impaired.

9. The only constructive action it appears possible to take is to enter into a genuine negotiation with the U.K. designed to eliminate, or almost eliminate, area of disagreement at lowest price that would have to be paid in terms of security considerations. Such a negotiation, however, unlike the one just concluded here, would have to be a real negotiation, i.e. with some flexibility in U.S. position and some readiness accept for decontrol some of those items which are “hard core” from U.K. point of view (in sense that continued embargo of them carries too high a political price in the U.K.).

10. I recognize that willingness to negotiate with some “give” on our part involves taking still further calculated risks on the security side. But, if we are unwilling so to negotiate, we take a grave risk both of major U.S./U.K. dissension and of disintegration of existing cooperative apparatus (CG–COCOM) in this field. With respect to former I understand that we went into this list reduction exercise on premise that U.S./U.K. solidarity and joint leadership in this field must be maintained at any reasonable cost; and that this position was laid down by the President himself. With respect to latter risk, if cooperative effort in security trade control field breaks down, we may find our security objectives far less well served in the long run than they would be by some present compromise.

11. As for the form and level of U.S./U.K. negotiation, if it is undertaken, without doubt quickest and most authoritative forum would be a face-to-face negotiation between Stassen and Thorneycroft. This, however, has disadvantage that it cannot be done without attracting public attention, and therefore without high-lighting fact that it is a U.S./U.K. rather than trilateral negotiation.

12. A better alternative would be to have negotiation conducted by U.S. and U.K. CG Dels in Paris. This would be inconspicuous and already has Charpentier’s prior assent to French non-participation. Any significant disagreement which remained could, on a last-minute basis, be referred to Ministers for resolution.

13. If this latter course is adopted, however, it will be necessary to issue quickly to USDel instructions which will be definite and clear yet sufficiently broad and flexible to permit desire outcome. USDel will forward specific procedural suggestions if negotiation is undertaken.

14. This urgent recommendation is, of course, without prejudice to possibility, as hinted in last Stassen letter,¹ that U.S. might, for overriding reasons related to Indochina situation, refuse assent in CG to present decontrol of any items on International Lists. Irrespective of whether U.S. feels compelled take such position at CG, we should seek sensible compromise of existing U.S./U.K. disagreement over content of a shortened control list to be put into effect either now or subsequently.²

Hughes

1. Supra.
2. Despite the fact that Special Representative Hughes found the prospect of discussions between Governor Stassen and Thorneycroft to be the less favorable of the two alternatives, the Department of State notified the Embassy in Paris in Topol 1635, June 29, 1954, that a meeting between the two had been scheduled in Washington for July 2–3, and instructed Loftus, the head of the U.S. CG Delegation, to make this known to the French Government. (460.509/6–2554) Regarding the French reaction to the Stassen–Thorneycroft talks, see the editorial note, p. 1225.