460.509/6–1754: Telegram
The Acting United States Special Representative in Europe (Martin) to the Department of State1
secret
priority
priority
Paris, June 17, 1954—6
p.m.
Polto 2074. Excon. For Stassen, Merchant, Waugh. Subject: July CG meeting—recommended US position.
- 1.
- As indicated immediately preceding telegram2 (sent Washington only), any hardening US attitude on EWT should find expression in formulation US position July CG meeting.
- 2.
- USDel while not in position fully
evaluate global international situation and its relevance EWT policies, nevertheless thinks following
propositions self-evident:
- a.
- Assumption of long-haul period of tension short of war is less tenable as basic premise now than it was in period from June 1953 to April 1954 when decisions contract strategic lists were first conceived and later internationally agreed.
- b.
- Prospects for long-term validity this assumption can be better assessed a few months hence than now.
- c.
- COCOM item deliberations pursuant April CG decisions have been conducted altogether on basis technical and commercial considerations (influenced to some extent by intelligence data of very limited scope, i.e., relation to Soviet bloc availabilities or uses of specific commodities narrowly defined); not discernably influenced by general political and strategic appraisals.
- d.
- If COCOM technical recommendations thus reached are translated into CG implementation decisions, they become for practical purposes all but irrevocable even though, on broad political and strategic assessment, they might be judged imprudent or wrong.
- 3.
- Furthermore, from strictly US point of view, other relevant
considerations are:
- a.
- Prospect large Soviet-supported military activity southeast Asia theater (with obvious consequences in Pacific theater) much greater now than in April; this necessarily modifies US views on strategic implication relaxation controls vis-à-vis USSR because directly impinges on US responsibilities Pacific area; and present plausibility of a wide differential in control pattern between East Europe and Far East much less than at earlier dates.
- b.
- List review has gone much further in fact than US anticipated or would have been prepared favor; US has, in course technical review (as per paragraph 2c above), made many concessions and compromises out of deference views other PCs and for sake achieving prompt completion COCOM review; hence US would be inclined question soundness of sum-total COCOM recommendations (as distinct from individual item decisions viewed separately); hence, even if basic assumptions unchanged from April, US would favor intensive review, from political angle, of total COCOM result; but since principal basic assumption now of much more dubious validity than three months ago, US should insist on such review since potential decontrol decisions so drastic.
- 4.
- If foregoing analysis correct USDel
recommends US position at July CG along
following lines:
- a.
- Prepared go along with immediate decontrol certain items from all three I/Ls, viz., items which were properly pruned from I/Ls because control no longer necessary or worthwhile. (US should have a prepared list such deadwood items, which easily identifiable) from among those on which unanimous COCOM agreement for deletion (as those on which unanimous or near-unanimous agreement Washington agencies during preliminary review).
- b.
- Re remainder of items agreed COCOM-wise for deletion, US recommends deferral of decision for three months pending reassessment over-all world situation.
- c.
- In meanwhile, such political reassessment (and its bearing on EWT) to take place through bilateral exchanges views, through CG meetings, through consultations among PC Foreign Ministers or through any combination such methods.
- d.
- In meanwhile also, all PCs conscientiously to re-examine from political and strategic, those important items viewpoint, emerging from COCOM list review as disagreed.
- e.
- COCOM deliberations since April meeting have produced useful recommendations re techniques of non-embargo control and reimproved enforcement; CG at its July meeting should consider which of these recommendations should be accepted for immediate execution even while results COCOM item discussions held in abeyance.
- 5.
- Washington authorities will no doubt have already given thought to possibility some important EWT discussions during or in connection with US/UK high-level consultations scheduled Washington June 25. This would be ideal occasion for US/UK bilateral reassessment as per paragraph 4c above. In view negotiating history, it would be most badly received were US unilaterally and as announced to take in CG such position as outlined paragraph 4 above unless preceded by US/UK consultation at highest level; and principal content forthcoming Washington talks provides perfect context for reassessment EWT policies.
- 6.
- If discussions as per paragraph 5 above was taken Washington, they might include, in addition to general political assessment, a few specific items or item-groups having conspicuous political character, e.g., petroleum complex.
- 7.
- Washington authorities will also no doubt evaluate most carefully results COCOM deliberations re tightened enforcement with view determining whether results this field satisfy US conditions stated in April CG and various preceding bilaterals as required concomitant for reduction of I/Ls. (Terminal enforcement meeting scheduled for today.)
- 8.
- If position taken by US roughly as paragraph 4 above, USDel assessment reaction other dels as
follows:
- a.
- Favorable (in varying degrees): Canada; Germany; Italy; France (probably); Japan and Portugal (for special reasons); Turkey (probably, but no evidence).
- b.
- Clearly unfavorable: Denmark; Netherlands.
- c.
- Probably unfavorable: Belgium; Norway.
- d.
- Unknown: Greece.
- e.
- UK reaction depends on outcome such conversation as envisaged paragraphs 5 and 6 above.
- 9.
- Comments addressee posts invited.
Martin