Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Guatemala

95. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Communications, Central Intelligence Agency ([name not declassified]) to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King)¹

Washington, February 9, 1954.

SUBJECT

• Establishment of Radio Station to Handle Tactical Communications for PBSUCCESS

1. At such time as operation PBSUCCESS enters the para-military phase, or begins the utilization of agent type communications to service intelligence nets, there will be a requirement for a small semi-clandestine radio station to handle these communications.

2. There are two major reasons why KUBARK should establish and operate such a radio station rather than support a station to be handled by Calligeris. By controlling and operating the base radio station, KUBARK has control of PBSUCCESS tactical communications and thus maintains control over the operation itself. The second major reason is that the operation of such a semi-clandestine radio base is a specialized skill not available except through KUCLUB. There is not sufficient time available to train Calligeris’ men to handle base station communications.

3. Technically the existing KUCLUB radio station in [place not declassified] could be utilized for this operation. However, communications originating in WSBURNT during the para-military phase and traceable as working into a U.S. Government radio station prohibits the use of this station.

4. The Sherwood installation and the base radio station could be combined into one installation thus making the most economical use of communications personnel available. The strong possibility that Sherwood could be compromised and lost before the para-military is entered into must be considered, thus making it unwise to combine the two installations.

5. Therefore, it is recommended that the Chief, WHD approve the establishment of the radio base station in KMFLUSH. The equipment necessary for the installation is not great and could be installed in an isolated safehouse anywhere in KMFLUSH, preferably north of the capitol city. The installation would be made by KUCLUB radio operators who would remain with the equipment until the station was activated.

6. The station could be operated on a limited basis handling PBSUCCESS communications with the Calligeris group without attracting any attention or being in any danger of location through DFing.

7. The station would become fully operational only for a few days during the para-military phase of the operation. At that time it would probably be necessary to assign two additional KUCLUB radio operators to handle the rapidly expanding communications. If desirable this station could also serve as an advanced operations base for the PBSUCCESS case officer during this phase.

8. At the completion of PBSUCCESS, the radio station would be deactivated at the earliest possible date, thus making the risks of operating the station relatively small.

9. If the establishment of the radio station is approved, implementation will proceed as follows:

a. Request Somoza approval for establishment, stressing that station to handle Calligeris tactical communications and that danger of disclosure through DFing, etc., negligible.

b. Obtain necessary site through Somoza.

c. Ship equipment KFLUSH next black flight.

d. Send two KUCLUB radio operators to KMFLUSH to set up station and to handle necessary communications until para-military phase.

e. Assign additional radio operators as necessary.

10. If at all possible, KUCLUB radio operators should be processed using passports under alias.

[name not declassified]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 77, Folder 2. Secret. The date of the memorandum most probably is February 4, 1954.