80. Memorandum for the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King)1

SUBJECT

  • PBSUCCESS
1.
At the time [name not declassified] was introduced into the PBSUCCESS Operation, WH/PW and [name not declassified] had prepared a basic general paper on the PW aspects of the anticipated RUFUS campaign. In addition, [name not declassified] had prepared a general outline paper on his views as to what he would do after PBSUCCESS became a success. Moreover, more than two million items of propaganda were shipped to RUFUS. Tape recorders and three mimeograph machines were on their way to RUFUS, three other reproduction machines (Gestetners) were up for immediate procurement, CEUAGE was in operation, CEUA (in Guatemala) was putting out over 100,000 pieces of propaganda every two weeks and organizing a newspaper. FAGE was being organized in San Salvador and plans were being made to put [name not declassified] in contact with LIONIZER group in Mexico. Furthermore, financial commitments, approved by the DCI had been made to [name not declassified]. WH/PW had already outlined to all WH Field Stations the general aims re Guatemala, sent them support materials, outlined future possible support and provided them with more than 20 initial themes.
2.
[name not declassified] ordered his staff to come up with a new PW program, though this officer tried to impress him with the fact that there was nothing in the plans which had not been coordinated with both RUFUS and [name not declassified], the only two people in the PBSUCCESS Operation who intimately know the psychology of the Guatemalan people, and that through bitter experience WH/PW had more or less of an idea as to what [name not declassified] and RUFUS would or would not buy. This advice was ignored and [name not declassified] proceeded without consulting [name not declassified].
3.
In a conversation with Seekford, this officer was told that [name not declassified] had told Seekford that Col. King, [name not declassified] and myself were no longer in the picture, and that he, [name not declassified], was directly responsible to the DCI. This information was passed on to [name not declassified], who then reassured Seekford that such was not the case.
4.
When [name not declassified] moved his office into Bldg. T–32, the PW file was broken up into numerous files, making it impossible for the PBSUCCESS PP Case Officer, Mr. [name not declassified], to read the background of PW planning.
5.
The three Gestetner machines promised to RUFUS before [name not declassified] arrived, were delayed for two months through confusion or oversight on the part of [name not declassified] and his staff.
6.
WH/PW took Mr. [name not declassified], WH/CPP over to T–32 to meet the PBSUCCESS group. He was told of a PW program prepared by [name not declassified] and his staff. I had never seen such a program and queried Mr. [name not declassified] re this after Mr. [name not declassified] had left, stating that I would like to see what they had come up with. Mr. [name not declassified] informed me that such a program was non–existent.
7.
[name not declassified] informed this officer that he would be in charge of activities in a regional area surrounding Guatemala, however, when action dispatches from that area were referred to him they were returned without comment or no action was taken. When questioned re this, no answer was forthcoming. WH/PW, Mr. [name not declassified], [name not declassified] and the regular country desk officers generally had to resolve whatever problems arose.
8.
Since this officer and [name not declassified] had been planning re control of the Mexican exile group, this officer repeatedly, through Mr. [name not declassified], asked for some sort of decision so that action could be taken. Such a decision has never been transmitted to Mr. [name not declassified] or this officer.
9.
This attitude of [name not declassified] toward [name not declassified] was one of, I am going to run this show my way and if it happens to coincide with that of [name not declassified], fine, if it doesn’t then … I’m running the show and we’ll control RUFUS and [name not declassified]. He also felt that [name not declassified] planning was dream material and too general. This officer felt and still feels that [name not declassified] knows what the people of Guatemala will accept in the way of propaganda and what they won’t. [name not declassified] is also smart enough to know that propaganda is going to have to be played by ear—to a large extent—during and after the PBSUCCESS Operation—thus has avoided too specific planning, but has evidenced every desire to cooperate with our wishes and has shown nothing but the completest ideological accord. In addition, every present PW mechanism (CEUA, CEUAGE,2 FAGE and their [Page 164]newspapers) was build by RUFUS and [name not declassified] (before [name not declassified] arrived) thus evidencing ability to produce smoothly without dictation. We should aid not drive.
10.
[name not declassified] has never told WH/PW what support it should try to give him other than that [name not declassified] must approve everything going to any WH station re Guatemala.
  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 151, Folder 4. Secret; Eyes Only. There is no indication on the memorandum of a drafting or originating officer.
  2. The Embassies in Guatemala City and Tegucigalpa reported on the anti-Communist activities of the CEUA and its publication CEUAGE in despatch 516 from Guatemala City and 240 from Tegucigalpa, December 16 and 4, respectively. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 714.00/12–1653 and 714.00/12–453)