63. Memorandum From [name not declassified] of the Central Intelligence Agency to [name not declassified] of the Central Intelligence Agency1

SUBJECT

  • Summary of Directives and Instructions on PBSUCCESS
1.
Pursuant to your verbal instructions of 4 November, there are listed below the principal directives, instructions and sources of instructions for Project PBSUCCESS.
2.
General (in “Policy” folder)
a.
“Guatemala—General Plan of Action” TS #, dated 11 Sept 19532
b.
PBSUCCESS Status Report, dated 29 October 19533
3.
US Military Assistance (in “Policy” folder)
a.
Various memos of conversations between Ray Leddy and [name not declassified]. JCS have approved arms assistance negotiations with Nicaragua, and formal Defense Department notification to State is expected momentarily. JCS have not yet approved negotiations with Honduras or El Salvador.
b.
The Guatemalan Government has requested several additional US Army personnel on a TDY basis, to be added to the US Military Mission. State (Leddy) has forwarded the request to Defense without comment. If necessary, State is prepared to ask Defense not to make the personnel available.
4.
Economic Warfare
a.
The Director of Security has been requested to obtain biographical data on proposed EW consultants. (“Policy” Folder).
b.
In discussions between [name not declassified] and [name not declassified] in New York on 2 November, it was agreed that there should be an approach to [name not declassified] to decide on EW methods directed toward cutting off petroleum and other supplies of the Guatemalan government. (For further details, see contact report written by [name not declassified], in “EW” folder.)
5.
FI
a.
Attached Memorandum from C/WHD to Chief of Station, Guatemala, (Attachment No. 1) outlines priorities for development of KUFIRE assets.
6.
PP
a.
WHD Field Memoranda 50–53 (Attachment No. 2) and 138–53 (Attachment No. 3) instruct all WHD stations on how to support the anti-Guatemala KUGOWN campaign throughout the hemisphere.
b.
WHD Field Memorandum 81–53 (available from [name not declassified] also deals with hemisphere-wide support of the above campaign.
c.
Attachment No. 1 outlines PP tasks of Guatemala Station.
d.
Mr. Frank Wisner has ordered [name not declassified] to use all WHD covert media to disseminate the Cabot speech and an Arthur Krock column which urges the US government to invoke the Monroe Doctrine in fighting Communism in the Western Hemisphere. ([name not declassified] files.)
e.
In discussions between C/PP/Ops, DD/P, etc. there has been talk of attempting to base various PP activities in [place not declassified] and of organizing some sort of “International Organization for the Liberation of Guatemala from Communism”. (Memos in “Policy” folder.)
f.
The $30,000 given to [name not declassified] in late September 1953 must last RUFUS through November. (Contact Report of [name not declassified], dated 6 October 1953, in “Policy” folder.)
7.
Instructions from WHD to Guatemala Station during 1953 (material extracted from Guatemala Chrono File).
a.
5 January, instructed Station to have Hediger continue writing articles about Guatemala for planting elsewhere in hemisphere. (According to [name not declassified]. ESCONSIN 1 now writes such articles.)
b.
26 February, Station was requested to furnish PO Box numbers used by Guatemalan Communists.
c.
6 April, Station was requested to furnish information of religious persecution in Guatemala for use elsewhere in hemisphere.
d.
2 April, Station was instructed to mail “mourning cards” for 30 successive days to Arbenz and top Communist leaders. Cards were to mourn the purge or execution of various Communists in the world and to hint forthcoming doom to recipients.
e.
17 June, Station was requested to collect the following material for hemisphere-wide propaganda:
(1)
evidence of worsening economic conditions
(2)
photos and facts on failure of land reform
(3)
evidence that only Communists were profiting
f.
19 June, Station was requested to report:
(1)
Its facilities for placing material in press and on radio
(2)
Its facilities for preparing material, printing and distributing it
(3)
Its capabilities to initiate strikes, etc.
(4)
Its access to Communist or official Guatemalan letterheads, signatures, seals and to information useful for character assassination.
(5)
Suggestions as to what action taken by the Guatemalan government would make it most unpopular at home; what the best [Page 135]targets for defamation are; which character assassinations could be most readily and profitably performed.
f.
[sic] 1 July, implied and direct criticism of Station performance was made by dispatch. Station was told that:
(1)
It had perhaps too willingly agreed to limitations imposed by the US Ambassador
(2)
It did not seem to be using security techniques
(3)
It had objected to the use of propaganda within Guatemala prepared outside the country, and had not made any alternate suggestions
(4)
It had been slow in answering dispatches or had not answered at all
(5)
Action and reporting on the labor situation were deficient.
[name not declassified]
  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 142, Folder 2. Secret.
  2. See Document 51.
  3. See Document 61.