Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Guatemala

227. Telegram From the CIA Station in Guatemala to the Central Intelligence Agency ¹

Guatemala City, June 23, 1954, 0749Z.

935. From JMBLUG to Whiting. Re: DIR 05857.²

1. I restate for perspective that a real show of force on 18 June could have tumbled govt.

2. Events over the weekend have left two alternatives:

A. Protracted struggle, which we eventually win.

B. Defeat.

3. I fear that concern for saving face in the UN, press and elsewhere may lead to the infinitely graver loss of face attendant on defeat. The “foreign posture of the country” in Latin America will be irreparably damaged by defeat in WSBURNT. If we win, nobody will listen to the Communist orders.

4. The issue now is how to wage the protracted struggle:

A. Give all support to Calligeris. We cannot afford destruction of his forces; better that they evade the enemy than be beaten. Calligeris still has three possibilities: at a maximum, he will win; or, he may trigger the army to revolt; at a minimum, he will simply keep tension alive. SUMAC has stated to me that the govt cannot stand prolonged tension. He repeated this one hour ago.

B. Step up the air offensive against the army, to induce defection or else crush it.

C. Step up the air offensive against the capital, to stir [name not declassified] remaining troops, encourage friends, frighten foes.

D. Replace the lost F–47 and procure as many other fighters as possible.

E. If neither Calligeris nor the army win, continue air attack on the capital until STANDEL cracks.

5. The question between STANDEL and us is only this: who will capitulate last?

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 11, Folder 5. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida.
2. Document 220.