181. Dispatch From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in
Florida to All PBSUCCESS Stations1
[place not declassified], June 13, 1954.
HUL–A–1045
SUBJECT
- General—KUGOWN
- Specific—Policy Guidance for Final Phase of PBSUCCESS
- 1.
- We are forwarding herewith copy of our Policy Guidance which is a
general outline of the KUGOWN effort
desired in support of the final phase of PBSUCCESS which has just
started.
- 2.
- In view of the continuous changes of the situation and the necessary
flexibility of the KUGOWN effort in
line with the progress of our KUHOOK action, our policy guidance had to
be confined to a fairly general plan the implementation of which we must
leave to you.
- 3.
- We shall supplement this general guidance by cable or dispatch, as the
situation may warrant, but we expect you to take all possible steps for
the implementation of this program without delay and without expecting
separate directives for every single step from us. We reiterate,
however, that all KUGOWN action must
be coordinated with, and subordinated to, KUHOOK action on the
spot.
Attachment
POLICY GUIDANCE
- 1.
- Our enterprise has now entered its final, decisive phase. We
cannot expect any more to change fundamentally the political
opinions and attitudes of large groups of the population during this
necessarily short period, but Psychological Warfare has nevertheless
a very significant role to play during this final stage.
- 2.
- The government has been trying frantically during the last two
weeks to recover the initiative which it had virtually lost
before—as had been indicated by the profound effect of Archbishop
Arellano’s pastoral letter, the impression
made by the opening of a powerful clandestine [Page 325] radio station, the highly successful
“32” campaign, the indignation provoked by the arrival of Soviet
arms and finally the distribution of oppositional leaflets by an
unidentified plane which swooped low over the roof of the National
Palace.
- 3.
- The government’s initiative consisted primarily of mass arrests
and house searches, climaxed by the formal suspension of
constitutional liberties—which had been practically disregarded
already before (arrests without warrants, people held incommunicado,
etc.). At the same time, the communists issued publicly orders for
the arming of labor and peasants’ groups, thus admitting their
uncertainty as regards the political attitude of the army. In the
diplomatic field, the government tried to seize the initiative by
offering Honduras a non-aggression pact (an offer which has been
turned down in the meantime), by offering direct talks between
Arbenz and Eisenhower (also rejected) and by a
world-wide propaganda campaign—supported by communists everywhere,
notably by Radio Moscow—which tries to denounce the opposition
movement as a “tool of foreign imperialists,” while at the same time
linking the U.S. State Department’s protest against the Soviet arms
shipment to the United Fruit Company’s financial claims (the old
“amalgam” technique which Stalin used already
in the beginning of his fratricidal fight against Trotsky and his
followers).
- 4.
- The government—or rather the leaders of the Communist Party
manipulating the figureheads in the government—obviously pursue a
triple goal:
- a.
- deprive the opposition movement of its heads through
arrests and of its voices through rigorous censorship
- b.
- intimidate and confuse the rank-and-file of the opposition
by a show of strength, while at the same time impugning the
motives of the opposition
- c.
- defend their position diplomatically by presenting
Guatemala as the victim of U.S. imperialist intervention,
mainly in the interest of UFCO and other
“monopolies,” thus preparing for the OAS conference and
gaining time for the consolidation of their internal
position.
- 5.
- Our Psychological Warfare effort in combatting this
government-communist policy must be focused on the following
objectives:
- a.
- Explaining to the people that the apparent “show of
strength” is actually a show of weakness, confusion and
hysteria and that the few smart moves of the government
(especially in the diplomatic field) have most obviously not
originated in Guatemala, but in Moscow and in Moscow-trained
minds;
- b.
- Weakening the enemy’s potential by showing them the
hopelessness of their stand, their increasing isolation, the
true motives behind the government’s actions and inviting
them to change sides—or [Page 326] at least to leave the government’s
side—while there is still time (but very little time
left);
- c.
- Giving as much direct, on-the-spot support to all moves
connected with the actual uprising against the
government—discouraging premature local actions as well as
panic, reducing the need for violence in persuading enemy
forces to surrender or to withdraw and mobilizing popular
support on the broadest possible scale.
- 6.
- Inside the target area, the above objectives will have to be
reached under the present circumstances primarily by clandestine
means, especially—though by no means exclusively—by the activities
of mobile Tactical Psywar Teams (for which special, detailed
instructions have already been issued before) which ought to include
(but do not have to be confined to)
- Issuance of clandestine bulletins and leaflets
- Nerve war action against enemy key personnel
- Rumor (whispering) campaigns
- Wall paintings etc.
- 7.
- The enemy relies especially on mass support through communist-led
labor and peasants unions and through front organizations of youth,
students, women, peace committees, etc. Enemy public mass meetings
and parades ought to be attacked by hecklers, spreading of sudden
panic rumors (e.g. telling people gathering for an open-air meeting
that an air raid is imminent or that store of explosives in a nearby
building is about to blow up), use of stink bombs, setting
inflammable displays, posters, banners, etc. afire, or the like.
Wherever arms are issued to communist-led groups, our friends and
sympathizers ought to try to get their share: if this is impossible,
we ought to start at least rumors that these weapons are getting
largely into the “wrong” hands.
- 8.
- Our main psychological efforts should be concentrated on the
following groups:
- a.
- Most Important—upon the members of
the Armed Forces, influencing them to side with the
opposition, or where this proves impossible, at least
inducing them to stand aside and not give any support to the
government;
- b.
- All other armed groups, police, armed workers and peasant
troops, etc. To the extent to which these groups are
composed of irredeemable enemies, they should be at least
weakened and so far as possible eliminated from the
struggle, by intimidating or confusing them, etc.;
- c.
- Workers in key enterprises, railroad, dockers, electrical
power plants, printing shops, etc. (to prevent them from
carrying out communist orders);
- d.
- Students and other young people who can possibly be
mobilized for active participation in the fighting on our
side;
- e.
- Housewives and other women who can (i) influence their
men, husbands, sons etc. in the armed forces, and so forth
(ii) undertake demonstrations before prisons, police
stations, government buildings, etc., asking for the release
of political prisoners, demonstrate against the use of
force, perhaps even physically impede the move of the
government forces, by crowding the streets, lying down on
railroad tracks, etc.
- 9.
- Rumors, combining fact and fiction, which ought to be circulated,
may include the following (not every rumor is applicable to every
group of people and to every situation; select from the following
suggestions whatever is suitable for given moment and audience):
- (i)
- A group of Soviet commissars, officers and political
advisers, led by a member of the Moscow Politbureau, have
landed (at the airfield, in Puerto Barrios, etc.);
- (ii)
- The government has issued an order devaluating the Quetzal
at the rate of 1:10. Use your money immediately to buy food
and durable goods;
- (iii)
- The government is about to change. Fortuny will take Arbenz’ place,
Pellecer Foreign Minister,
Gutierrez will be made Minister of
Government (Interior), Monzon propaganda minister, etc. Fortuny,
Toriello and
Fanjul are being flown to Argentina
in a two-engined Soviet jet plane.
- (iv)
- In addition to military conscription, the communists will
introduce labor conscription. A decree is already being
printed. All boys and girls 16 years old will be called for
one year of labor duty in special camps, mainly for
political indoctrination and to break the influence of
family and church on the young people. These labor troops
will also be used for special missions in other
countries.
- (v)
- Food rationing is about to be introduced and the money
which people can no longer spend on food stuffs and other
consumer goods is to be made available to the government by
means of a compulsory loan.
- (vi)
- Arbenz has already
left the country. His announcements from the National Palace
are actually made by a double, provided by Soviet
intelligence.
- (vii)
-
An educational reform is being prepared. There will be
no longer any religious instruction at state expense,
but on the contrary lessons in atheism, Soviet
style.
Add rumors of your own, following the day-by-day changes
in the situation.
- 10.
- The efforts of our friends inside the target area must be
supported to the utmost from outside, by radio, newspapers,
leaflets, teams of border crossers, etc. This outside effort must be
subordinated to the program outlined above. All outside groups, by
listening to our own [Page 328] radio
station as well as the other news broadcasts, must adapt their
activities on a day-to-day basis to the developments inside the
target area.
- 11.
- An all-out effort on a 24-hour basis, using all human and material
resources within reach, must be started immediately to implement the
above program in support of the decisive last steps of our
enterprise.