138. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida1
Washington, April 30, 1954, 2211Z.
48833. (From Whiting). Re: LINC 2261.2
- While we appreciate there may be need for proposed leaflet drops and recognize validity your supporting arguments, any use our own aircraft for this purpose presents both policy and practical difficulties. It would be direct involvement ODYOKE assets and in event of mishap would be most spectacular and conclusive proof implication. Moreover we have no available planes suitable for purpose since C-47 or other slow-flying aircraft would be too vulnerable.
- Believe possibility use either [name not declassified] or Identity A owned and crewed aircraft safer and better for many reasons if it possible arrange this. Would consider it desirable have Calligeris explore this possibility with Identity A as part his proposed discussion and request for assistance. If Identity A amenable then details might be worked out between [name not declassified] and Identity A providing for staging or basing of one or two Identity A aircraft on [name not declassified] field.
- As a general commentary upon this or any other proposed use of aircraft, request that you consider the impression which will be created [Page 272]by and the conclusions which will be drawn from, the obviously integrated use of aircraft in conjunction with D-day operations. It seems to HQs that the addition of this mechanistic refinement coming on top of the use of radio and other intricate features of the plan will almost inevitably set upon this operation the seal of a non-Latin product. This is entirely apart from the strict question of security, the point being that even if we were able to do this without security leaks and without any mishap, the conclusion would nevertheless be drawn by our friends and foes alike in the United Nations, etc. that this could not be anything other than what it in fact is, and certainly could not be an indigenous uprising.