Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Guatemala

123. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in [place not declassified]¹

Washington, April 10, 1954, 0111Z.

45998. To: [place not declassified] (for SKILLET from Whiting). Refs: A. [telegram indicator not declassified] 109; B. [telegram indicator not declassified] 111; C. [telegram indicator not declassified] 108; D. [telegram indicator not declassified] 091.²

1. Ref A: Double Uncle.

2. Both ODACID and KUBARK seriously concerned about extent of SKILLET’s³ personal involvement as revealed by above references. We had never contemplated that SKILLET would be projected into firsthand discussion of details this operation with such persons as Pres. WSHOOFS and Chief of Air Staff. Unable to state at present time what effect this exposure will have on ODACID judgment re continuation operation in present form, but we already on notice very strong feelings of doubt re advisability trying maintain present timetable. At high level meeting scheduled for tomorrow we hope obtain some clarification ODACID position and will communicate results this discussion.

3. Will also raise at this meeting your question Ref C re what assurances, guarantees SKILLET authorized give Pres. WSHOOFS if this subject raised by him. However, should point out that SKILLET’s giving of special and additional official guarantees as quid pro quo for his cooperation this matter would be clear indication if not acknowledgment ODYOKE official responsibility. This would remove last vestiges of carefully erected and tediously maintained basis for denial official responsibility.

4. Re request arrangement invitation WSHOOFS Defense Minister (Ref B) and also timing deliveries and arrangements storage matériel (Ref C), more time will be required before any approval can be given these proposals let alone action taken thereon. At present we much prefer hold matériel in place rather than send it forward and hand it over to tender mercies WSHOOFS who might refuse release it at critical moment or even use this possession as bargaining or evidentiary weapon against us.

5. Concerning para 3 (Ref D) Whiting understands that instructions have already gone forward from ODACID authorizing delay of brief but unspecified period of action re military treaty. We continue to feel negotiation this treaty and any news releases which could be made concerning it of great impact upon WSBURNT military thinking. Therefore extremely important progress this as rapidly as conditions permit. Your judgment as to timing requested in light of foregoing.

6. SKILLET may rest assured all his messages being closely followed by Whiting personally and that Whiting fully aware of pressures under which everyone connected this matter laboring.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 142, Folder 4. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner.
2. None printed; telegrams 109, 111, and 108 are dated April 8, April 9, and April 8, respectively. (Ibid., Box 13, Folder 2) Telegram 91 is dated April 7. (Ibid., Folder 1)
3. A handwritten marginal note reads: “Amb to Honduras, Whiting Willauer,” and an arrow points to “SKILLET”.