S/P Files: Lot 64 D 563
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Prepared in the Department of State
Participants: First Party and Second Party.
This memorandum covers a further conversation by long distance telephone between First Party and Second Party mentioned in earlier report of conversations of January 6 and 7 and January 13.
Second Party said he had talked to Third Party regarding the points in the last conversation.
[Page 1520]Third Party had expressed the highest degree of interest in the … proposal.
Third Party said this should be carried “as far as possible”. On First Party’s inquiry, Second Party said this meant “to as many places as possible, over the longest radius possible, and in the shortest time possible”.
Time was now of the essence, Third Party had emphasized.
The leaflets should contain a long statement in reasonable, dispassionate language.
It should stress that the Chinese cannot trust their official sources of information.
In this connection, Second Party said that Sian-fu had been selected as the capital in event of war. Leaflets should go there.
The message should stress the question: Why did the Peiping régime turn down the pacific, generous cease-fire proposal?
It should emphasize that this rejection served no Chinese interest, only the interest of a foreign power, the U.S.S.R.
It should be under UN sponsorship. It should list the countries supporting UN actions.
It should stress the themes of no territorial ambition and no warlike intention.
It should emphasize that the course chosen by those determining Peiping’s choice is unreasonable and contrary to Chinese interest.
It should appeal to the patriotism and national feeling of the Chinese.
It should state that it is not our objective to dictate the form of government in China, and that the form of the present régime is not the cause of our differences.
It should stress that if the Chinese had not allowed themselves to become tied to the Moscow chariot, and got into the reckless Korean adventure, they would by now have realized their aspirations regarding the UN.
It should stress that it is not our object to support Chiang Kai-shek and to force him upon China. It should say that if the Chinese should persist in their present course, they may indeed get Chiang back.
The message should speak of our esteem for the Chinese people and culture. It should stress our desire to spare their cities from destructive bombardment.
It should stress that if the worst comes to the worst the people should clear out of their cities to save their lives.
It should stress that the United States is acting in Korea not on its own but in obedience to the UN.
Second Party said Third Party was trying to get back as soon as [Page 1521] arrangements could be made. He said Third Party had communicated to his sponsors in China the information given as to the United States attitude.
Second Party said the … proposal was frowned on by Third Party. It would bring fear and dismay to the Chinese people but would not harm or hinder those who would be its real targets.
Second Party quoted Third Party as saying that it would be difficult to make satisfactory arrangements between Third Group elements on the mainland and any of the Chiang old guard on Formosa even if Chiang were out of the picture . . . .
In passing on the above information First Party said the following:
It is manifestly impossible to carry on as a UN venture the propaganda effort suggested. However, it might be possible to state the proposition in such a way as to emphasize the UN angle and deemphasize the U.S. source. It might even be possible to have the message originate with some non-U.S. source, if possible in the UN, and then pass the statement along to the Chinese as one originating in UN deliberations, stating the source.
Under whatever aegis, it would be difficult to make the suggested statements regarding our disinterest in Chiang and the warning that they might get him back. That would have to be done with a light touch and with great indirection if done at all.