Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 2

320.2–AC/6–551: Telegram

The Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

secret   priority

New York, June 5, 1951—4:32 p. m.

1606. Re AMC. During course of conversation with Jebb at end last week on Chinese representation question he inquired with reference to the Admiral Sherman testimony¹ whether we had in mind discussing any further additional measures with view to taking them up in AMC. I said we did not know of any immediate plans in this direction. I expressed view that prior question was whether UN members would agree to complete econ embargo. If not, they would clearly not agree to blockade. On other hand, if they agreed to embargo, problem of blockade would assume lesser importance, except from standpoint of controlling Soviet bloc sea trade with ChiComs. I added, however, that since we could not altogether foresee what might develop in Korean war, in order to be prepared it would seem wise for us to discuss quite informally at early date possibility of additional measures. Jebb agreed that this might be good idea. Commenting on Sherman testimony concerning naval blockade, Jebb questioned whether complete econ embargo or naval blockade would not do “certain countries” more harm than ChiComs. I indicated that answer to this question would have to be determined by experts of our two govts competent to evaluate probable effects.

Also at end last week Lacoste approached Ross saying that unofficial visitors from Washington had indicated to him that the “prevailing opinion” in Washington was in favor of additional measures along lines Admiral Sherman’s testimony. Lacoste asked whether we contemplated approaching them with regard to additional measures. He was informed that we have no instructions to do so. On other hand, Ross commented personally that we could not predict with certainty how the campaign in Korea would go, nor could we predict that additional measures would not be necessary. It might therefore seem part of elementary wisdom for us to consult very informally together concerning possible further measures in order avoid inevitable confusion which would arise should we fail to consult and one day find ourselves confronted with necessity of further action. Lacoste very readily agreed that informal discussion with us and British would be useful thing. He said that of course naval blockade would create very difficult problems for British but not so many for French. He corrected latter part of this comment by saying his govt also would of course consider naval blockade a very serious matter.

In accordance with Deptel 961, June 2,² and Ross–Popper telecon we are proceeding to discuss with UK and French dels questions of shipping controls and US draft report to AMC.

We feel that it would also be most desirable for us to discuss very informally with UK and French dels (and possibly a very few other members of AMC) various possibilities envisaged by AMC bureau report (US/A/AC.52/12, Mar 8, 1951).² If Dept sees no objection we will proceed to do so.

It would also seem most desirable for us to discuss with UK and French dels at least, before reaching final decision, question of whether new appeal should be made through UN, and if so in what form, for additional forces. Informal discussion of these matters would, of course, be exploratory at this stage and avoid implication we contemplate immediate action pending evaluation of reports received pursuant to May 18 res.³

Gross

1. Reference is to the testimony of Adm. Forrest P. Sherman on May 30 and 31 before the Senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations. See Hearings, pp. 1508 ff.
2. Not printed.
2. Not printed.
3. In reply, the Department informed the Mission at the United Nations that it had no objection to informal discussions with British and French Delegates, but asked that the United States not appear at this stage to be pressing the British and the French for the immediate adoption of extreme measures. The Department considered that the immediate task of the Additional Measures Committee was to ensure the greatest possible effectiveness of the May 18 resolution, and it did not wish to jeopardize this objective by the contentious discussion of more remote possibilities. (Telegram 976 to New York, June 8, not printed; 320.2–AC/6–851)