320.2–AC/4–2051
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)1
Subject: Additional Measures Committee
| Participants: | The Eight Honorable Sir Oliver She well Franks, K.C.B., C.B.E., Ambassador E. and P., British Embassy |
| Mr. C. A. Gerald Meade, Counselor, British Embassy | |
| Mr. John D. Hickerson, UNA | |
| Mr. Ward P. Allen, EUR | |
| Mr. Robert W. Barnett, CA | |
| Mr. David H. Popper, UNP |
Sir Oliver called at our request for a, discussion of our plan for action by the AMC in the economic field.
I outlined our proposal in some detail. I said that we thought that in the light of the terms of the General Assembly resolution of February 1 and of the situation as we saw it, it was necessary for us to press for action in the AMC. I stated that we wished to avoid public disagreement with our friends in the AMC but that we felt it was now necessary for the Committee to meet. We were suggesting April 30 as a possible meeting date; we could hardly be accused of undue haste, because by that time three months would have elapsed since the passage of the General Assembly resolution.
The Ambassador surmised that our domestic opinion might account in part for our activity—which I admitted—and noted that domestic opinion in the United Kingdom might be impelling his government in the opposite direction. Disclaiming any expert knowledge on this subject, Sir Oliver stated that so far as he knew the UK position had not been changed, and that he thought the Foreign Office views were based on three considerations on which he would be glad to have our thinking. First, without challenging our interpretation of the February 1 resolution, he gathered that the Foreign Office felt that nothing should be done in the AMC as long as there was any hope that the GOC might successfully engage in negotiations; in other words, AMC action might be prejudicial to negotiations for a peaceful settlement. Second, the Foreign Office wished to restrict the effects of the Korean problem as closely as possible to Korea itself—that is, the UK would not wish developments to flow from the Korean problem which would hamper the build-up of NATO strength or involve us more deeply in [Page 1969] the Far East before we were prepared for action there. Third, as a general matter the Foreign Office considered that the United Nations had a dual function: it was an instrument of collective security, but also an instrument of mediation and conciliation. The Foreign Office, in this case as in others, was inclined to lay greater weight on the mediatory function of the United Nations than we were and correspondingly less weight on the punitive function. This was particularly true in the light of the increased possibility of Soviet withdrawal from the United Nations if the Soviets became convinced that the second function was being submerged.
In replying to Sir Oliver’s remarks, I stressed our view that failure to carry out the terms of the February 1 resolution might well be interpreted as evidence of weakness or timidity in Peiping and that Peiping’s disposition to negotiate would if anything be decreased if it seemed that we were weak or divided. We agreed that the Korean conflict should be localized, but subject to that we were convinced that we must do everything we could to impress upon the Chinese Communists that it was in their interest to halt the aggression.
Sir Oliver then asked us whether we considered that our program would be effective from both the economic and psychological point of view, since he gathered that the Foreign Office was inclined to doubt its effectiveness on both grounds.
Mr. Barnett explained our position with regard to the economic effectiveness of a United Nations embargo on the shipment of strategic materials to Communist China. He pointed out that the complete embargo applied by the United States had been more effective than Ave had originally expected: it had, for example, in cutting down the Chinese import requirements for cotton by about eighty per cent, impaired an important sector of the Chinese urban economy (the textile industry). A general embargo on strategic materials would over a period of months have an increasing effect on other sectors of the urban economy, through the denial of metals, medicines, and machinery for war production. The trade statistics for February 1951 showed that existing restrictions in Hong Kong were beginning to curtail Chinese imports. A UN resolution would enable the Hong Kong authorities to justify their restrictions on trade with China, and it would enable the United States, for example, to approach countries such as Pakistan and urge them to cut off their shipments of cotton to China. In other words, an embargo resolution would enable countries imposing restrictions to make known the hitherto confidential character of the international cooperation which exists in applying such restrictions and would enable those now applying restrictions to utilize this expression of free world opinion as a means of tightening embargo [Page 1970] controls in particular countries. Mr. Barnett stated that he would be giving more detailed information on this subject to another officer of the British Embassy later in the day.
I continued the discussion by turning to the psychological aspect of our embargo proposal, elaborating on the connection between limited economic sanctions and the prospects for negotiation. I agreed with the Ambassador’s remark that we felt we must make the way of the transgressor hard if we were to induce him to seek peace, always provided that we did not extend the conflict. I indicated that for almost three months we had gone far to accommodate ourselves to the view of the UK, and that we thought it was now time for the UK to come a little distance toward us. I pointed out that our domestic public opinion problem with regard to Korea was bound up with public support in this country for our program in the Western European area generally.
Before leaving, the Ambassador noted that all of our activity with regard to the Korean problem was colored by the positions of the United States and other governments with regard to the Chiang Kai-shek regime and to a lesser degree the problem of Formosa. He pointed out that some of our activities were regarded as measures to support Chiang against the Chinese Communists rather than as measures directed against the Chinese Communists alone. While acknowledging that this might be so, I made it clear that in our view the first task of the United Nations was to meet the aggression in Korea, and that any action with regard to Formosa or the position of Chiang Kai-shek could only follow thereafter.
- Drafted by Mr. David H. Popper.↩