320.2–AC/4–1751: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
1416. AMC subcomite meeting. After Lacoste (France) took chair, Gross urged subcomite to agree and recommend at once to AMC that first priority is additional economic measures and that AMC should promptly commence consideration of such measures, looking toward earliest GA res covering economic measures, some form of organization to review and report information from UN members and possibly make its own comments. Selective embargo proposed by US would be upon atomic energy materials, arms, ammunition and implements of war, petroleum and items useful in production of arms, ammunition and implements of war. He emphasized necessity of reaching agreement as soon as possible on series of recommendations as follows:
- 1.
- Selective embargo,
- 2.
- Establishment of UN comite to receive reports and with reviewing and reporting function,
- 3.
- To ask members to determine which of their exports fall under general formula and to undertake not to negate effectiveness of embargoes by other nations.
We felt that such an indication by UN of its determination to continue to oppose aggression, might have moral and political impact on Chi Comms, as factor inducing them to seek cease fire and to reconsider plans for offensive.
[Page 1965]Jebb (UK) stated it continued to be policy of his government to emphasize “efforts for negotiated settlement with Peiping”. In this regard, he cited north Korean “peace feeler” on which he did not place much hope but felt it might indicate something. Therefore, he felt there should be no report from AMC until it was “abundantly clear” that no hope of negotiated settlement exists. If nevertheless it were decided to press ahead, only sensible procedure in his view was some sort of selective embargo such as Gross had outlined. Basically, however, UK attitude is that taking additional measures now would make Chi Comms less willing to negotiate. He intimated, however, his government might be open to persuasion on this point. He also suggested it might be wise to ask GOC their reaction to North Korean “peace feeler”.
Shann (Australia) found main point to be question of timing and not of substance. He also agreed with UK that it was important to leave “free field” if efforts for negotiated settlement were to come to fruition. In addition, he stated that to take matters on to the first comite would only result in “re-exposition of bitter divisions”. Frankly speaking, Shann thought many quarters feel chances for negotiated settlement now much better and many sponsors of Feb. 1 res favor renewed efforts along that line. He agreed with UK that North Korean “peace feeler” merits observation and seconded suggestion to seek GOC’s reaction.
Speaking as chairman, Lacoste stated divergence of views which appeared from these remarks were not on matters of substance of US views where indeed it is agreed, once embarking on such course, economic measures should have priority; divergence exists in view of past week’s political climate and feeling embarking on course outlined by Gross would be dangerous and might nip successful developments in bud. Speaking as rep of France, he associated himself with UK’s remarks that first consideration must be peaceful settlement and everything else is secondary. In summarizing, he felt one must consider two aspects of problem: agreement and disagreement outlined previously, and he questioned us in regard to its views on timing.
Gross replied substance and procedure are difficult to separate. He reminded subcomite US has placed general embargo on all shipments to Communist China. US view is that in principle it would be desirable for maximum number of members to apply maximum of economic controls over relations with China. US was aware of desirability and necessity of obtaining widest acceptance of whatever measures adopted. He stressed that proposals he had outlined were “irreducible minimum” and urgency of US program is part thereof. This was so because such measures might reasonably be adopted very soon, and questions [Page 1966] of substance and timing were thereby closely related. He warned as more time passes, limitedness of US program becomes less practical.
As Gross understood UK point of view, GOC’s progress or lack of it has more definite relationship to AMC work than US willing to recognize. Gross recalled Feb 1 res authorizes AMC to consider question of additional measures as “matter of urgency”. Furthermore, AMC was only authorized to withhold report if and when GOC reported satisfactory progress. Gross stressed that emphasis was placed and continues to remain on AMC unless and until GOC reports progress. In addition, common sense favors this approach, for if work of AMC were halted or were geared to pace of GOC, this would put premium on failure of GOC. Gross urged AMC work should not be considered as starting only upon GOC failure. We had favored “careful pace, but with sense of urgency”.
Jebb did not dissent from Gross’ views. He argued there has been sort of “negative progress” of GOC, since it had not been turned down yet. Even if AMC makes report, Jebb cautioned this need not be positive report. In fact it could say no measures appeared worthwhile taking. He felt selective embargo was sensible course of action but only effect of such would be “slight tightening of trade”. He questioned favorable psychological effect on Chi Comms and pointed out that interpretation of psychological effect was basis of divergence in views.
Shann injected another consideration in addition to GOC as relating to AMC labors. This was military and diplomatic one of declaration now being planned in Washington, London and Paris. Jebb hastened to agree with this.
Gross said it seemed obvious that subcomite was not in position to recommend a meeting date to AMC. He therefore posed some general questions to chairman.
Could subcomite agree on something? He suggested for example an agreement in principle that matter of first priority was question of additional economic measures. Secondly it might be agreed in principle that AMC should commence consideration of this question in near future. He warned it was publicly known that subcomite was meeting and if silence were only outcome implication would arise that subcomite was recommending no action be taken.
Speaking again as chairman, Lacoste pointed out debate had gone beyond terms of reference of subcomite in discussing matters of substance and general philosophy of additional measures. He felt there had been general agreement on what to do under certain circumstances. On other hand, there was deep and grave disagreement on two important points which lined up US on one hand and UK, France, and Australia on other. First there was question of timing of AMC action [Page 1967] or when it would be appropriate to make recommendations in report to GA. Secondly there was question of likely psychological effects on Chi Comms of proposed course of action. On this second point Lacoste felt US estimate to be that peace would be favored by its course of action and hence desirable to present concrete plan of action; that, to summarize this view, softness would be detrimental to peace. In regard to Gross’ questions, consideration was whether subcomite could, without fixing date for meeting of AMC, decide it would meet some time in near future with certain plan of work. This, he stressed, was particular task of subcomite to decide in accordance with terms of reference. Lacoste suggested that subcomite either adjourn and consult with govts or prepare agenda without fixing definite date. Jebb proposed compromise that subcomite adjourn until Wednesday afternoon which would give time for consultation. Then it could be suggested subcomite has agreed on program of work, i.e., proposing study of selective embargo and that AMC meet when chairman decides. Australia seconded UK’s proposal. UK stressed value of meeting Wednesday so item on work of this subcomite would be in Thursday1 papers. Gross suggested possibility of studying substantive work in subcomite and proposed an interim report by subcomite to AMC that it was preparing program of work and requesting authority to consider substantive matters. Lacoste questioned desirability of AMC meeting after so long period of silence which in effect did nothing. Jebb renewed his suggestion of meeting on Wednesday2 afternoon. It was agreed that subcomite would meet again Wednesday 4 p. m.