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Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of General Assembly Affairs in the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Popper)
US/A/AC.52/19
Subject: Additional Measures Committee (AMC)
| Participants: | Mr. C. A. Gerald Meade, Counselor, British Embassy |
| Mr. Ward P. Allen, EUR | |
| Mr. David H. Popper, UNP |
Mr. Meade showed us a copy of a communication from the Foreign Office to the UK Delegation in New York, containing British Cabinet views on the work of the AMC.
The British decisions were summarized in three points:
- 1.
- The major emphasis should continue to be placed on efforts to arrive at a negotiated settlement with the Chinese Communists.
- 2.
- The UK will oppose imposition of any political sanctions against China, in the AMC study, and will also make it clear that the only economic measure which the UK could support if the GOC fails would be a selective embargo on strategic materials.
- 3.
- The UK will seek to prevent an AMC report to the General Assembly until the GOC has failed, and will seek to ensure that the report does not go beyond a recommendation for a selective embargo together with any possible measures immediately related to the Korean situation—for example, additional assistance to United Nations forces in Korea.
We pointed out to Mr. Meade that the British position left us some [Page 1953] what perplexed and disappointed. We wondered whether “a selective embargo on strategic materials” was consistent with the United States’ formula for economic sanctions, but Mr. Meade was not able to give us specific information on the point. We also pointed out that the British position that no report should be made until the GOC fails is in conflict with the General Assembly resolution of February 1, which merely authorized the AMC to defer its report if the GOC reported satisfactory progress. As we all know, no progress whatever had been made by the GOC. It appeared that the British still believed that additional measures might provoke the Chinese Communists to continue the aggression, while our analysis indicated that they would if anything provide an additional stimulus for the Chinese Communists to seek a peaceful settlement.
Mr. Meade expressed inability to go into further detail, since he had no elaboration of the message from London. He asked us to be certain that the UK Delegation in New York did not become aware of his having communicated the substance of the instruction to the UK Delegation directly to the Department, and of course we agreed to do so.