IO Files: Lot 71 D 440
Memorandum of Conversation, by James N. Hyde of the United States Mission at the United Nations
US/A/AC.52/18
Subject: Additional Measures Committee
| Participants: | Sir Gladwyn Jebb, Mr. Denis Laskey and Mr. John Coulson, UK Delegation |
| Mr. Francis Lacoste, Mr. Pierre Ordonneau and Mr. Jacques Tine, French Delegation | |
| Mr. David Popper–UNP, Mr. Robert Barnett–CA, and Mr. Ward Allen–EUR, State Department | |
| Ambassador Ernest Gross and Mr. James N. Hyde, US Mission |
This meeting was called by Ambassador Gross to lay a foundation for moving on with the work of the Additional Measures Committee.
1. Military Measures
Gross referring to Jebb’s suggestion that military measures be given priority commented that we thought there were many disadvantages to involving the Additional Measures Committee in military matters but that if it were to be done it might be got out of the way at once in the full Committee. Jebb commented that he had made the suggestion because he thought military matters were a non-controversial item but in the light of the United States point of view he did not press the idea.
It was therefore agreed that no immediate attention would be given in the Additional Measures Committee to military matters.
2. Economic Measures
In opening this subject Gross felt there was general agreement on a program of economic measures along the lines of the United States proposals (position paper dated March 26, 1951).1 He restated the essence of these proposals from the position paper and agreed at the [Page 1947] request of the French to give them the substance of this in writing purely as an informal working paper.
As to timing the introduction of such proposals into the subcommittee, Gross realized that no decision could be reached at this meeting, because there were other related negotiations going on which would make it impossible to decide at this moment on when to proceed. There was general agreement that this was correct. Gross went on to say that he would feel the time had come for us to discuss these measures with other delegations and Jebb and Coulson understood this, observing that they hoped we would conduct our consultations without publicity. Jebb commented that we understood the uncertainty of his Government on the desirability of sanctions. He expected to talk with the Canadians and explore with them their thinking that any measures in this Committee be strictly limited to their proximate result in Korea. It was agreed that consultations would take place forthwith and Gross felt that there would not be any particular publicity connected with our talks.
Much of the conversation was about compliance with any proposed Assembly resolution and the role of a special committee. It was agreed that the United States theory of a formula as contained in the position paper mentioning specifically only petroleum, atomic energy materials, arms, ammunition, implements of war, etc. would be agreeable. Jebb commented that he had no objection to this formula, which he termed a short list, and was willing to drop his suggestion of a detailed list since the United States disliked it. However, Coulson argued that when we come to compliance he saw certain advantages in a specific list. Lacoste commented that he sees this plan as a general measure having principally a moral aspect, because 90% of the trade with Communist China that we can control is already controlled. The remaining 10%, about which we are talking, he called a “small material thing” secondary in its importance to the moral aspect of the plan.
He went on to warn that if our plan as outlined did not command a substantial majority its mass moral effect would then be negligible and in his view it would be better to settle for the 90% control of exports which we now have and not risk a defeat on the moral issue.
Coming then to the question of compliance with the proposed formula, Barnett outlined how the plan would work. He observed that an embargo is largely in effect now. Assuming the resolution were adopted each state would indicate to the new committee what materials were covered by its interpretation of the formula. This would be a dynamic program that the Latin Americans would probably agree to, although in fact their exports to Communist China are negligible. The adoption of the resolution by the Assembly would be the acceptance of this principle. The next step would be the announcement in the [Page 1948] Committee of actual controls by each state. The United States would announce what it was doing. Coulson stated that the United Kingdom would state that items covered by the formula are subject to export licenses and they would not be issued. Lacoste was not able to state what the French approach would be.
Arriving at uniformity of action under the formula would be worked out bilaterally. After this the Committee would make periodic studies of controls and consider what gaps there were in the way the system was operating. If it were not possible to close these gaps by the machinery of the United Nations, efforts would be made through diplomatic channels.
It was generally assumed that the Soviet Union and probably India would not take any steps to follow the recommendation of the proposed resolution and the question would then arise how to handle this. Jebb wondered how we would know who was not complying by trans-shipment or strained interpretation of the formula and what the Committee should do about it. It became clear that the one real issue as Gross stated it was the problem of non-conformity after the committee was operating. Jebb commented that we would not desire to extend any embargo to India as punishment for non-compliance, because the resolution is merely a recommendation and neither legally nor politically would it be desirable to punish the Indians for their disregard of it. Barnett and Allen commented that it was clear that we do not intend to extend the embargo against India and this would be a problem we could approach only through diplomatic channels.
Gross commented that the Indian attitude would in no sense be a new problem, because they would be doing then exactly what they were doing now. He wondered what the committee would do about Soviet non-compliance. It occurred to him that there might come a time when the United States would want to announce in the committee what in fact we are already doing in the way of embargoing exports to the Soviet Union. Barnett commented that so far as India is concerned, our approach to non-compliance would be along the lines of scrutinizing export licenses with the possibility of trans-shipment in mind. Gross thought it was possible that there would be pressure in the committee to get the Soviet Union involved in some United Nations type embargo. He added that this would be something that the committee could undertake under its power to review and report to the Assembly with appropriate recommendations. Barnett commented that another type of recommendation the committee might make would be to broaden the scope of the embargo. For example, it might recommend that food be embargoed as a way to weaken the Red army and also items that have a dual civilian-military use, such as transportation equipment. Coulson thought that these were matters better discussed [Page 1949] in the Coordinating Committee but Barnett thought that we would want to argue our rationale for full economic warfare against China.
The meeting closed with the understanding that we would be free to discuss this plan confidentially with other delegations and that we would confer again about the timing of presenting such a plan to the subcommittee.