320.2–AC/2–751: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
1122. Re work of Ad Hoc China CMC—UK and French views. Gross1 and Ross2 discussed with Jebb3 and Coulson4 at lunch yesterday (February 6) work of Ad Hoc China CMC in light Deptels 685, February 5, 680, February 25 and 643 January 20.
Department will recall that Gross discussed substance Deptel 643 with Jebb at time of receipt. Yesterday he reviewed contents this telegram in light general approach set forth Deptel 685. British initially revealed slight attitude suspicion that we might be wishing to force pace but this feeling we allayed without difficulty. General tone discussion was very cooperative and we feel laid basis for avoiding any serious differences while developing mutually acceptable program on basis close consultation.
Re military sanctions (paragraph 1, Deptel 643), there was no difference of view.
Re economic sanctions (paragraph 2, reftel) Jebb and Coulson personally did not appear to see any great difficulties so far as British themselves were concerned of selective embargo based as minimum on export controls already being applied by governments participating in control of trade with Soviet bloc. They were not, however, for moment in position to speak for UKG. In general, they raised question extent to which even such selective embargo might be expected to rally support of large majority of Assembly. We ventured no dogmatic prediction on this point but expressed confidence that once mutually acceptable program worked out with British it seemed reasonable to suppose that through out joint efforts satisfactory majority support of Assembly could be achieved. In particular Jebb expressed some curiosity re our views on specific items. We indicated our understanding Department was studying whole matter broadly but we did not yet have detailed instructions on specific items.
Re political sanctions (paragraph 3, reftel), British were noncommittal to points reviewed by Gross. They dismissed their position in Postal Union on grounds this is purely technical body. We had [Page 1896] impression differences of principle might more readily arise in this area than in economic or military areas.
We achieved very close community of views re election of officers and committee procedure in initial stages. Without particularly urging our own views, British very readily fell in with idea of electing Muniz6 and Shann,7 respectively, as chairman and rapporteur. … We outlined our thinking that when committee meets, presumably next week, purpose should be not to get involved in discussion and debate but to proceed immediately to election of officers who would be requested by committee with assistance of secretariat to work out and report plan of work to committee. We had in mind that we and British would develop our ideas on such work plan which would be communicated to friendly and wholly trustworthy bureau. In this way, neither we nor British would be under necessity of putting forward and staking our prestige to any particular plan. It was our concept further that following approval of work plan by committee, bureau would again proceed with assistance of secretariat in development of studies contemplated by work plan. In this later stage, we would also in close consultation and cooperation with British assist the bureau.
Jebb raised question of consultation with French and we agreed with him, of course, that we would through this process wish to work in very close consultation with French as with British.
During course of discussion, Gross took occasion to make clear to Jebb that Department, including Secretary, thought his explanation of vote on US resolution in Assembly was not well calculated to develop program on cooperative basis we all wanted. Jebb said he had had commendatory telegram from Foreign Office. He also said that he did not mean nor had he said that Ad Hoc Committee should delay consideration of additional measures but he thought he had indicated clearly his feeling that the “Assembly” should not at this time consider additional measures.
In afternoon Parodi,8 who visited Lake Success, expressed interest in our ideas and Gross reviewed with him and Chauvel9 our thinking. As in ease of British, no important differences emerged in this discussion. General attitude of Parodi in particular was similar to that of British in sense of wanting to move slowly and on fully consultative basis.
Parodi agreed with suggestion made by Chauvel that Ad Hoc Committee [Page 1897] should not consider political sanctions since they did not involve “technical” matters but that this subject should be left to main committee.
- Ernest A. Gross, Deputy U.S. Representative at the United Nations.↩
- John C. Ross, Deputy U.S. Representative to the Security Council and member of the U.S. Delegation to the General Assembly.↩
- Sir Gladwyn Jebb, United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations.↩
- John Eltringham Coulson, Deputy United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations.↩
- Not printed; it contained the Department’s ideas with respect to organization and procedure for the committee (320/2–251).↩
- João Carlos Muniz, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations.↩
- K.C.O. Shann, Acting Head of the Australian Mission to the United Nations.↩
- Alexandre Parodi, Secretary-General, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.↩
- Jean Chauvel, Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations.↩