Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 2

693.93B/9–651

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Perkins) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant)¹

secret

[Washington,] September 6, 1951.

Subject: US Position versus Sino-Tibetan Agreement.

CA proposed certain broad generalizations which may bear upon future policy decisions. Briefly, the following observations are suggested for consideration; comments from recipient Offices will be appreciated.

1. Available reports do not indicate that the Tibetan Delegation which traveled to Peiping had sufficient authority to sign on behalf of, and to bind legally, the authorities of Tibet. The best available information indicates that decisions of high policy customarily are considered and ratified by the Tibetan Kashag and later are formally approved by the Dalai Lama.

2. Repudiation by Tibet is desirable but is unlikely.

3. Any US Government statement referring to Tibet’s autonomy should be based upon the de facto autonomy apparent in Tibet’s history rather than on any US position vis-à-vis the Simla Convention.²

4. Several political alternatives are available to the US. These are: (a). If Tibet repudiates its agreement with China, the US Government could issue promptly a statement sympathizing with and supporting the Government of Tibet. (b) If Tibet either does not repudiate or affirms the agreement through obvious Chinese pressure, there are the following possibilities:

(1) The US can issue a unilateral statement setting forth the decision of the US not to take cognizance of the Sino-Tibetan Agreement.

(2) Jointly with the UK, the US can issue a statement similar to that proposed in (1) above.

(3) The US can bring the Tibetan problem formally to the attention of the UN.

(4) The US can refrain from any public action but indirectly can attempt diplomatically to encourage either the Government of India or the UK to protest either to the Tibetan authorities or to the Peiping regime that implementation of the Sino-Tibetan Agreement appears to contravene the trade provisions of the Simla Convention (which accords most-favored-nation treatment to British and, by succession, to Indian commerce in trade with Tibet).

5. The most probable development seems to be involuntary Tibetan acquiescence in the Agreement. In anticipation of that development, the following actions are proposed:

(1) A copy of the US legal opinion³ should be forwarded to Embassy Delhi to serve as the basis for informal Embassy discussions with the UK High Commissioner and the Government of India.

(2) The US should await developments with a view to issuing a unilateral statement approximately two or three months hence, setting forth the decision of the US Government not to take cognizance of the Sino-Tibetan Agreement because duress apparently was imposed upon the Tibetan negotiators in China and because Tibet, through aggressive military action of the Chinese Communist regime, lost its freedom to accept or reject.

(3) Diplomatically, the US should endeavor to use Tibet as a weapon for alerting GOI to the danger of attempting to appease any Communist Government and, specifically, for maneuvering GOI into a position where it will voluntarily adopt a policy of firmly resisting Chinese Communist pressure in south and east Asia.

The present danger is that the Chinese Communists will consolidate their position inside Tibet without receiving any public condemnation from any non-Communist country. If Tibet’s de facto autonomy is lost, the US should not let this Communist success be classified as a victory through diplomatic default.

1. The memorandum was also directed to David W. Wainhouse, Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Donald D. Kennedy, Acting Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs, G. Hayden Raynor, Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Conrad E. Snow, Assistant Legal Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs, and Kenneth Krentz of the Policy Planning Staff. A notation in Merchant’s handwriting on the source text read as follows; “I concur in the memo and its recommendation. LTM”. Merchant had marked the recommendation in numbered paragraph 5 (2).
2. The text of the Simla Convention of July 3, 1914, between Great Britain and Tibet, may be found in The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1959), pp. 124–127. Although a Chinese Representative had taken part in the Simla Conference of 1913–1914 which drafted the convention, the Chinese never signed or ratified it; it was, however, accepted as binding by the British and Tibetan Governments.
3. Memorandum from K.B. Fite to Perkins, August 8, not printed (693.93B/7–1251).