795.00/12–651
Memorandum of Conversation, by Ward P. Allen of the Bureau of European Affairs
Subject: Korean Armistice
| Participants: | Ambassador Wrong, Canada |
| Mr. Hickerson—UNA | |
| Mr. Ward Allen—EUR |
Ambassador Wrong had been requested by Foreign Minister Pearson from Paris to obtain clarification of US views on certain aspects of the proposed declaration to be issued in the event of an armistice and the courses of action to be followed in the event of a violation.1 The UK have given Canada (as well as Australia, New Zealand and South Africa) copies of Foreign Minister Eden’s telegram to Churchill reporting on the Acheson-Eden meeting in Rome November 27, and Mr. Churchill’s reply to Eden.2 Based on these, Mr. Pearson raised the following points:
1. Consultation: He feels that Canada should have been consulted by the US directly before now and not be expected to obtain its information solely through the British. He feared that without direct consultations Canada “might be confronted with US–UK agreement and be asked to accept it unaltered or without sufficient time for consideration.” Ambassador Wrong suggested it would therefore be tactful and desirable that the Department keep him informed. Mr. Pearson had suggested using the Washington liaison arrangements of those countries fighting in Korea for a general discussion of the future courses of action. However, Ambassador Wrong readily agreed with Mr. Hickerson’s view that this was not the appropriate procedure, and in response to Ambassador Wrong’s request Mr. Hickerson assured him that we [Page 1255] would discuss the matter with Canada directly. Mr. Hickerson, however, indicated our concern that the UK had at this juncture brought in all four senior Commonwealth members since we did not yet want to consult widely and were worried about French reaction if they should discover that they had not been consulted as early as the UK and the Commonwealth.
2. Inspection: Mr. Pearson stated that he thought the US was adopting a very realistic attitude in permitting General Ridgway to accept less than completely satisfactory inspection provisions and he realized that the general US formula to meet a serious violation of the armistice is necessary. Nevertheless, he is worried that in the desire to obtain an armistice, insufficient attention is being paid to the possibility of precipitating a general war. Mr. Pearson stated it was not clear from his information whether the US intends that General Ridgway could take the indicated action in the event that there were merely a strong build-up in Manchuria, or whether he must wait until an actual attack. Mr. Hickerson stated, and the Ambassador agreed, that as the messages themselves made clear what the Secretary discussed with Mr. Eden was a serious violation of the armistice, i.e., a major attack on UN forces, and that General Bradley had confirmed this. However, Mr. Hickerson pointed out that if a serious build-up should be discovered and a large-scale attack appeared imminent, this would be a situation that would have to be considered and we might nevertheless want to take retaliatory steps.
Mr. Pearson felt that every effort should be made to get the Communists to accept inspection by bona fide neutrals and indicated either the Scandinavian states or India as acceptable. It was agreed that the recent Communist suggestions regarding the composition of a neutral commission had in part met this point and Mr. Hickerson stated that our preliminary thinking in Washington is in general not averse to utilization of such states for this purpose.
3. Proposed Declaration: Regarding the proposed declaration at the conclusion of the armistice, Mr. Pearson stated that he saw “disadvantages both in form and in substance.” As to form he asked initially whether we contemplate a statement to be made only by the US, by the US and UK, or by the US and the Commonwealth. Mr. Hickerson replied that our present thinking is of a short general statement by the 16 nations with forces in Korea, but that this subject was under discussion with the JCS and since he had not been able to attend the meeting he was uncertain as to whether this thinking had undergone any change. He promised to advise Ambassador Wrong if anything new developed on this as a result of JCS consideration.
[Page 1256]Mr. Pearson stated he was not convinced that the UN could not be more directly associated with the statement and is rather attracted to Mr. Eden’s suggestion of having Ridgway report to the GA, which could then note armistice approval and state that any breach thereof would be seriously regarded by the UN and dealt with appropriately. It is in Mr. Pearson’s view highly desirable to associate the UN with the political settlement, and a GA resolution regarding the armistice and consequence of a breach would be consistent with and a step toward this end. Mr. Hickerson stated we are still turning over in our minds the best way of associating the GA with the armistice, although we feel that issuance by the GA of the sort of statement we have in mind for the 16 nations is impractical. We are of course in full agreement that the UN must be closely associated with political settlement. We outlined to Ambassador Wrong our general thinking regarding action in the SC and GA following the armistice, looking toward a political settlement.
Moreover, Mr. Pearson is still not completely convinced that such a declaration is the best way of making known to the Communists the effect of a violation. Such a formal statement “might unduly provoke the already highly developed Chinese sensitivity.” In groping around for an alternative method, Mr. Pearson suggests the possibility of having the substance of the statement made directly to the Chinese military representatives at Panmunjon by representatives of the Unified Command when the armistice is concluded. Such a statement would certainly leak in one way or another to the press of the world. Part of Mr. Pearson’s concern is desire to avoid the necessity of Canada’s making an individual statement. Mr. Hickerson responded that while we would look into this alternative suggestion, our initial reaction is that it would not be as effective, and Ambassador Wrong stated frankly he did not think so much of it either.
4. Action to be taken in event of violation: As to the specific measures which might be taken in the event of a major violation, Mr. Pearson agrees with the UK view regarding the lack of efficacy of a naval blockade. The military effect of a naval blockade would probably not be felt by Chinese Communists fighting forces for a period of weeks or perhaps months. Even bombing airfields beyond the Yalu is no certain method of bringing the Communists to terms, and Mr. Pearson is still worried as to whether such specific measures might not be the opening gun for an extension of the ground war to the Chinese mainland. In response, Mr. Hickerson felt it important that we should realize that if the Chinese Communists should launch a large scale attack in violation of the armistice we will be confronted with a completely new war and the lid must be off on any type of [Page 1257] military action which we would consider effective, short of ground operations against China. A naval blockade might be part of this, and as to bombing, it would certainly be more than bombing the airfields in Manchuria. It should include major communications and transportation centers, for example. Ambassador Wrong agreed that the security of the UN forces must be of paramount consideration and recognized the impracticability of determining in advance that in the event of an attack such specific limited measures as bombing of Manchurian airfields would be the only measures taken.
5. Returning to the problem of associating the UN with the armistice, Ambassador Wrong threw out the personal idea of considering the use of the POC in this connection, if only by way of stating in any declaration that we would ask the POC to observe in the event of any violation of the armistice. We replied that the idea might be worth some thought but had some doubts as to its desirability.
- Canadian Foreign Minister Pearson had discussed the proposed declaration and other subjects related to Korea with Messrs. Gross and Ross of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly in Paris on the previous day. (Telegram Delga 530, December 6, from Paris; 320/12–651)↩
- See the messages transmitted to the Department of State by the British Embassy under date of December 3, pp. 1221 and 1223.↩