795.00/12–551: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State
flash
532. As pointed out mytel 47 July 161 and other reports from here appeals for action to secure release many thousands South Koreans in Commie hands have been publicly made several occasions since armistice talks started. In addition Emb has received several petitions from [Page 1253] various groups and individuals. Believe Koreans have been surprisingly restrained this issue as official attitude has been to quiet public protestations and counsel leaving problem in hands UNC negotiators who it was assumed wld raise issue at appropriate time. Chosen Democratic Party, consisting mainly refugees from north, have understandably been among most vocal group attempting keep issue in public eye. While influence this group shld not be overestimated, they are quite articulate and views given publicity in press.
At mtg Nov 4, four-point resolution regarding armistice talks renewed demand for return of kidnapped persons. (See Embtel 530, December 5).2 Vice Pres Kim only yesterday sent me message from his sick bed stressing return of 20,000 kidnapped Koreans as most important issue in connection armistice, particularly as so many much needed leaders were among group.
In short it is my feeling failure broach question under Item Four, if subj UN and other foreign (mainly German missionary) civilian internees is raised, will evoke widespread comment and dissatisfaction in South Korean circles. Armistice unpopular as it is and seems unwise give Koreans excuse jeer at UN failure press for return missing persons.
I fully aware Commies unlikely agree return ROK civilians but horse trading tactics armistice talks have reached stage that best approach seems to be make initial demands far exceeding those for which ultimately willing to settle. Occurs to me matter might well be taken up under Item Four with expectation agreeing under pressure defer to Item Five. On other hand presentation lists poses real problem in view unreliability and incompleteness of available data. Also there will always be possibility some persons included who either did go north voluntarily or who later decided play Commie game.
Only existing lists I know of are (1) ROK OPI list 2,438 persons from Seoul area taken north, 976 killed by Commies in Seoul during 1950 occupation and 1202 missing from Seoul area, and (2) list 2527 persons kidnapped from ROK (preponderantly from Seoul), listed according their professions, prepared by association of families of kidnapped persons. Neither list is complete and they overlap. Figure generally given is 20,000 civilians taken north. I doubt if existing or subsequently revised lists shld be presented to Commie del although as mentioned I see no reason why demand shld not be made under Item Four of agenda for full accounting and return of survivors. Commies cld be asked for lists as will be done for PWs. Counterdemands re north Koreans in ROK cld be agreed to. In practice if lists such persons [Page 1254] furnished they presumably wld include only persons in custody but not countless refugees who are here voluntarily.
Re matter approaching ROK, assume this necessary if additional lists required or if question not to be raised at all. However, if my suggestions accepted do not see need make any special approach to ROK this time other than possible to reassure key leaders subj to be raised under Item Four.