795.00/12–351
The British Embassy to the Department of State
Telegram From the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the British Embassy in Rome1
Please arrange to convey communication in following terms as soon as possible to Acheson, if available, or failing him Lovett and Bradley.
2. I have discussed with my colleagues the suggestions made at our meeting in Rome on the evening of 28th November about the next steps in the Korean armistice talks. We are most grateful to Mr. Acheson and his colleagues for taking us into their confidence as they did, and we are most anxious to keep in very close touch on this matter.
3. We think that the United Nations negotiators should continue to press for the most effective possible supervision arrangements. They might try for joint inspection teams at key points or failing this for supervision teams led by neutrals (e.g. Scandinavians). We realise, [Page 1222] however, that it may prove impossible to get any satisfactory arrangements and that, if the talks are not to be allowed to break down, Ridgway may have to proceed on the assumption that the Communists are acting in good faith. In the event, we agree that on conclusion of an armistice he should report back to the United Nations that it has not been possible to agree on what he considers adequate supervision arrangements, but that, in order to bring hostilities to an end, he has accepted arrangements, the effectiveness of which depend entirely on the bona fides of the other side.
4. We agree that in that event warning statements should be issued about the very serious consequences which would arise from a major breach of the Armistice arrangements by the communists. I do not consider that the warnings should be made only by the United States and United Kingdom, nor do I think that a collective statement by the United Nations would be practicable. It seems to me that the statements should be made by the United States, United Kingdom and as many as possible of the countries contributing forces. These warning statements should be in very general terms and, in our view, should if possible be identical. It would be unwise to be precise about the nature of the counter action which we should feel obliged to take, but we might, for example say that in the event of such a major breach, it might prove impossible to localise hostilities as hitherto. We should of course like to discuss the draft.
5. We agree that such a major breach of the armistice agreement would confront us with an entirely new situation, which might well necessitate more drastic measures on the part of the United Nations Forces, but we do not think we should at this stage commit ourselves as to what precise measures should be taken.
6. Our preliminary views on the two measures mentioned by the Americans are:
- (a)
- Naval Blockade of China.
- China is not dependent to any real extent upon seaborne imports for the maintenance of her present war effort in Korea, and in the short term this war effort could be maintained in the face of a sea blockade by a combination of the overland supplies from the U.S.S.R. and the production of China’s own war industry. Admiralty do not feel that a sea blockade would produce effective results, except over years rather than months. They also feel that unless the Soviet ports were included, it would be futile. This last point has to my mind raised the gravest issue, as it would be a direct hostile act against the Soviet Union which is exactly what we are both so anxious to avoid. Therefore we are not at all convinced that a sea blockade would be a useful measure.
- (b)
- Bombing North of the Yalu.
- Neither are our staffs sure that decisive results would follow from the bombing of the Chinese airfields and bases and junctions across the Yalu. However we would much rather proceed in this way than by the sea blockade. It is here to be noted that munitions sent through Soviet ports might be intercepted in this way.
7. We would like the United States and United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff to discuss these matters in detail between them, and our people over with you are fully briefed on the details.
8. We are sending you shortly a note on trade with China.2 Our information is somewhat different from yours.
9. I know you will understand that we must inform Canada, Australia and New Zealand of these exchanges.
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This telegram was transmitted as telegram 1099 to Rome on November 30 along with the message printed infra. Both messages were then passed on to Mr. Acheson who reported this to the Department in telegram 2444, December 1, from Rome, not printed (Black Book, Tab 2). The copies of the British messages here printed were conveyed under cover of a note dated December 3 from Mr. Tomlinson of the British Embassy in Washington to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson.
Following the NATO meetings in Rome, Mr. Acheson returned to the United States by sea, with Mr. Webb serving as Acting Secretary of State until mid-December.
↩ - Infra.↩