Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 7: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
C–58513. For info CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 506.
“Further to HNC 505. Reconvened 1500.
“1. Nam Il opened in following vein: UNC during morning presented no new reasons for retaining islands. Since both sides have agreed to demarcation line why does UNC insist on retaining forces in rear of other side. The arguments used during discussion of the demarcation line are no longer pertinent. This is a test of whether UNC is willing to respect the agreed demarcation line. If the agreement has value the UNC has no ground for its demand. If armistice is to be stable what reason can UNC demand have? What is the purpose? How is it possible? It is inconceivable. The other side opposes this after agreement on the demarcation line. It is a violation of the agreement. So long as UNC insists on this the other side cannot take seriously the UNC proposal of restricting introduction of armed forces to enhance the stability of the armistice. If the UNC were to abide by the letter and spirit of the agreement on the demarcation line it would prove that the UNC proposal that both sides refrain from introducing into Korea armed forces and equipment is really designed to stabilize the armistice. As for the UNC proposals on restricting military facilities and free inspection, they are an interference in the internal administration of the other side and involve political questions. They exceed the scope of the negotiations and are unacceptable. In order that no more time be wasted it is hoped UNC will no longer insist on these proposals. UNC use of unorthodox arguments to persist in these demands implies UNC assumes itself the victor who required the other side to submit. This cannot be tolerated as both sides are on an equal footing. The delegation of the KPA and the CPV shall continue to oppose these proposals. With the greatest sincerity we and all who hope for an early agreement solicit your most serious consideration of this statement.
“2. UNC replied in general as follows: There is nothing to be gained by further discussion of the islands. UNC offered previously to participate in adjustments involving its withdrawal from the islands. [Page 1220] The other side refused. UNC accepted the refusal stating that it would retain the islands. The other side must now accept the consequences of that refusal. To sum up, both sides are agreed on principles 1, 2, 6 and 7. The UNC has made it clear that it considers principles 3 and 4 essential. Persistent refusal of the other side to accept them only confirms their essentiality. The UNC and people of the world have been warned by this refusal that the other side seeks in the armistice not a step towards peace but a period in which to build up its military potential. It wished to do this in secrecy, free of observation by the joint armistice commission. In spite of protestations about peace the UNC can give credence only to actions. Resistance to these principles indicates an intent to violate them. Thus, more than ever, the UNC must insist on their inclusion in the agreement which binds both sides. No progress can be made until the other side alters its views on these principles. The more the other side opposes them the more the UNC mistrusts their motives. The delegations are now separated by four points of difference:
- “(1)
- Introduction of reinforcements and limitation of supplies, equipment and facilities
- “(2)
- Joint observations at principal ports of entry and communication centers as mutually agreed, free movement over communication lines for joint observation teams; joint aerial observation and photographic reconnaissance
- “(3)
- Unilateral insistence by the other side that UNC give up the islands which it will not do without suitable adjustment and
- “(4)
- And unilateral intention of other side that it be free to increase military capabilities, especially airfields. These four points are the basic differences. By concentrating on them it might be possible to find a solution.
“3. Nam Il inquired if adjustments in connection with the islands was related to the military demarcation line.
“4. UNC said it had no desire to reopen agenda item 2; it would retain the islands.
“5. Nam Il again sought clarification and was informed that UNC did not refer to item nbr 2.
“6. Nam Il asked if the matter of construction of air fields within his position was not an internal affair.
“7. UNC replied as follows: Statement of the other side give strong evidence of its intent to use armistice to improve its military position that it should seek enabling provisions in the agreement is incredible. Its statement that it must, during the armistice, build up combat air capability, including airfield construction, is alien to its protestations of good faith. The other side openly expresses an intent to increase military capabilities. It uses the weak pretext of a requirement for [Page 1221] increased AA facilities, but it alone would determine whether increased capability would be used offensively or defensively. The intended rehabilitation of airfields is an increase in military facilities which provides an increased capability. The rebuilt fields would be useful only if air elements were introduced into Korea. Since the other side subscribes to the principle of non-introduction of reinforcements there is no case of additional air facilities. Airfields are not an internal matter when they add to offensive capabilities. The UNC firmly opposes any development of military airfields.
“8. Nam Il said that nothing new had been said; all had been refuted and that the attitude of the UNC was delaying the conference. He inquired as to whether UNC had any suggestion for the settlement of the four outstanding differences.
“9. UNC said it was looking to him for a suggestion in this respect and proposed adjournment. Meeting adjourned 1628. Delegations meet 3 December at 1100. Signed Joy.”