Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 4: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, Far East ( Ridgway ) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
C–58449. HNC–503. For info, CINCUNC Adv HNC 503. “Report of armistice conference 1 Dec 51. Convened 1100.
1. Nam Il asked for a reply to questions asked yesterday. UNC made a statement setting forth in full its views on rehabilitation and reconstruction in answer to Communist charges that it seeks to limit peaceful reconstruction.
2. Nam Il replied that he did not consider this a satisfactory answer to his question and requested a 15-minute recess. Upon returning he made a statement in the following vein. UNC third and fourth principles are unreasonable, its fifth principle not clear. The three are self contradictory and inconsistent with UNC stated positions. On the one hand the UNC proposes no introduction of reinforcements into Korea, on the other it asks for exchange on a man-for-man basis. To insure against resumption of hostilities foreign troops should be reduced positively during the armistice. There is no reason for continued introduction of troops. What reason can UNC have for seeking exchange of troops on man-for-man basis? Why does UNC want to introduce fresh units and personnel into Korea and what reasons does it have for replenishment and replacement? UNC has stated that an armistice should provide adequate safeguards for security of troops. Yet it demands limitation on reconstruction of military facilities during the armistice. Korean people have the right to reconstruct, rehabilitate and to reinforce defensive facilities destroyed by wanton bombing. Interference with this right cannot be tolerated. Does the UNC seek by this pretext to prevent the repair and reconstruction of defensive facilities? What cannot be labeled by UNC as military facilities for offensive purposes? UNC holds that armistice negotiations are strictly military and involve no political questions. Yet it insists that the supervisory organ have access to all of Korea, thus directly interfering in the internal affairs of the other side. The authority of this organ should be confined to that necessary for carrying out terms of armistice. Our side has no intention to interfere in the internal affairs of that part of Korea controlled by UNC. There is no need for access to all parts of Korea, to carry out the armistice. It would be a flagrant and unwarranted violation in internal affairs which has no justification in a strict military armistice. What is the purpose of the UNC in this respect? We have fixed a demarcation line and a military zone to separate the armed forces and provide [Page 1213] a definite demarcation line with which to cease all hostilities and make it difficult for them to be resumed. This was the basic condition for an armistice. Therefore, each side should withdraw its forces in rear of the demarcation line. This is the inevitable consequence of fixing the line. Yet UNC still attempts to retain armed forces on islands in our rear—an obvious violation of the spirit of the agreement on the demarcation line. What is the object of the UNC in this respect? Perhaps it wants to make the armistice unstable by retaining forces in our rear. Perhaps it is for some ulterior motive that UNC seeks limitation upon increase in armed force for stated purpose of stabilizing armistice. What object is the UNC pursuing?
3. UNC replied its objective is a just and reasonable armistice which will insure against resumption of hostilities pending final settlement of the Korean problem. UNC stated Nam Il’s statement contained no new thoughts; most had been refuted previously, none would stand up under examination. UNC then made the following statement: ‘In order that you may understand clearly our views concerning this military armistice, I shall make a very important statement. During the past 4 days, the UNC has stated its position on agenda item 3 and has explained it in full. Everything in our proposal is as fair to one side as to the other. Every specific principle which we have stipulated is designed to enhance the stability of the military armistice and to increase the prospects of any early peace in Korea. All of these principles are strictly military. None are political. We have stated 7 principles upon which the solution of item 3 of the agenda must be based. We have listened to your objections to these principles. We now reject these invalid objections categorically.
You oppose observation by jointly manned teams throughout Korea. You oppose the limitation of forces on both sides, limitations designed to assure that no increase in military capabilities occurs on either side during the period of the armistice. You have attempted to force out of consideration joint observation of the manner in which armistice terms will be adhered to. You have sought to avoid limitations on military capabilities during the period of armistice. You have tried to submerge these fair and open arrangements by dragging into discussion the question of withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea. You have done this, knowing full well that withdrawal of forces from Korea is a subject inappropriate to this military armistice conference. Here is our answer:
First, we will continue to insist, as an element of an acceptable armistice agreement, that neither side will introduce into Korea any reinforcing military units or personnel during the armistice.
Second, we will continue to insist, as an element of an acceptable [Page 1214] armistice agreement, that neither side will increase the level of war equipment and material existing in Korea at the time the armistice becomes effective.
Third, we will continue to insist, as an element of an acceptable armistice agreement, that a military armistice commission of mixed membership shall be established to provide supervision over the execution of and adherence to the terms of the armistice agreements.1 This commission and its joint observation teams shall have authority to observe at ground, sea and air ports of entry and communication centers throughout all of Korea as mutually agreed to by the two delegations, together with freedom of movement over principal lines of communication throughout Korea. The commission shall likewise have authority to establish joint aerial observation and photographic reconnaissance over all of Korea and complete joint observation of the demilitarized zone.
Fourth, we will continue to insist that the question of withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea is entirely beyond the purview of this military armistice conference and subject to ultimate determinations by the governments concerned.
We shall continue to insist on the inclusion of the foregoing principles in the armistice. With all the earnestness at my command I urge you to cease raising objections to these fair principles. We, and all who seek peace, await your considered answer with deepest concern.
Unless you have something new to offer, I suggest we recess until such time as you designate in order that you may carefully study my statement.’
4. Nam Il replied that he found nothing new in this statement and that he waited for a full response to his morning statement. He then proposed a recess until 1500 hours.
5. Meeting recessed at 1233 hours. Signed Joy”. Report of afternoon session follows.
- The word “agreements” was changed in a supplementary copy of this telegram to read “arrangements”. (JCS Files)↩