320/12–151: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
Delga 465. Re Korea. In planning handling of Kor item in SC assuming there is an armistice, Gross and GADel staff have been considering SC procedures and draft resolution on the theory that SC consideration wld be a preliminary step to broad and general debate and action to fol in the GA. We are mindful of comments in position paper SD/A/C.1/368,1 page 7, and also Dept’s views as contained in Deptel 75 of Aug 14 [4] to USUN.
Prelim conversations which we expect to have with other SC members wld be first with US, Fr, Turkey, Netherlands and then perhaps Brazil. We are also considering thereafter, tentative conversations with USSR which wld cover general lines of SC resolution.
1. Alternative 1 is type of resolution suggested by Jebb and reported in USUN’s 115, of July 10[19]:2
“The SC, having received the report from the UC dated (blank),
“Notes with approval the conclusion of an armistice in Kor and expresses its profound satisfaction that hostilities have been brought to an end on terms acceptable to the UN,
“Requests the GA to consider the measures which shld now be taken to bring about a final settlement in Korea in accordance with the principles and objectives of the UN.”
This draft, although it wld present some difficulties for USSR in first and third paras, wld be hard for them to veto or to oppose with a counter-resolution.
2. Alternative 2 closely fols views contained in Deptel 75 of Aug 14 [4] to USUN and comments in position paper 368:
“The SC, recalling and reaffirming its resolution of June 25, June 27 and July 7, 1950, and
“Recalling that the said resolution of July 7, 1950, created a UC and requested the US to designate the commander of forces operating under it and requested the US as a consequence to provide the SC with reports on the course of action taken under the UC;
[Page 1211]“Notes with approval the report of the UC dated (blank) and the terms of an armistice contained in it;
“Requests the SYG to transmit this resolution to the GA as material to its objective which is the establishment of a unified independent, Democratic Govt in Kor by peaceful means.”
3. (a) Alternative 2 presents difficulties not only with USSR but also with friendly dels.
(b) If the resolution refers to and reaffirms past SC resolution and if it is generally and strongly supported, pol consequences wld be undesirable. On the other hand, we see no advantage of forcing a Sov veto, because we want to get quickly from the SC to the GA and a broad acceptance there. Also, no doubt is thrown on the validity of previous SC resolution by failing to cite and reaffirm them, because it is generally recognized in SC precedents that these resolutions continue in full force and effect until further affirmative action by the SC. In any event, new GA resolution on Korea.
(c) This draft might lead USSR to table short form of resolution simply approving armistice. They cld then veto our alternative and put us in position of having to support theirs.
(d) If USSR were to vote against recitals of previous SC resolution and there were seven affirmative votes, then we feel this negative vote wld be a veto and not a preliminary vote, so the resolution wld finally be put to the vote without them. Although as sponsors we might rely on SC rule 32 and insist resolution be voted as a whole, USSR might attempt tactics we used on 13 Sept 1949 of a procedural motion that the resolution be voted in parts. If USSR got seven votes for this, that wld be tantamount to suspension of rule 32. In any case, this wld probably lead to a long procedural wrangle.
4. In the light of the above considerations, we hope that pending info obtained from proposed tentative conversations Dept will suspend judgment on what form of SC resolution shld be selected.
5. Any form involves again placing Korean case on SC agenda and Council wld then have to dis-seize itself by a separate resolution which we could use whether or not there is a veto of the substantive resolution.3
- Dated October 12, p. 1020.↩
- Telegram 115, July 19, not printed; the thrust of Mr. Jebb’s earlier resolution is set forth in Delga 615, December 11, from Paris, p. 1302. See also telegram 59, July 10, from New York, p. 644.↩
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The Department of State transmitted the following response in telegram Gadel 323, December 2, to Paris:
“Re Korea. Pls refrain Delga 464 and 465 from any conversations with other dels subject matter these tels pending receipt further word from Dept.” (320/12–151)
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