Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 146: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

secret   priority

C–58207. CINCUNC Adv HNC 491 for info.

“Further to HNC 490:1

“1. Nam Il opened afternoon session with strong refutation of 3 and 4 principles proposed by UNC. He said the UNC seeks to delay solution of Korean problem through a prolonged armistice and that to attempt to substitute an armistice for a peaceful settlement is to disclose an unwillingness to settle the problem peacefully. He said there is a possibility of an armistice not primarily because there exists a balance of force but because of the wishes of the people of the world, including those of the US. Moreover, he said, there is a possibility of further solutions immediately after the armistice; however, setting up a permanent balance of force in Korea will not lead to a peaceful solution. The resumption of hostilities in Korea can be prevented not by a state of balance of war but by the elimination of war through the withdrawal of foreign troops and subsequent steps for peaceful settlement of the Korean problem. Therefore, he said, as soon as the armistice is realized, the governments concerned should negotiate the withdrawal of troops and discuss other ways and means for peaceful settlement of Korean problems and speedily put them into practice. This, he said is the only real guarantee against resumption of hostilities and the third principle of the UNC is groundless. He said if the UNC insists upon starting broad discussions now on preventing resumption of hostilities his side is in favor of doing so, but the question of the withdrawal of foreign forces within a definite period must come first. He said again that the concrete measures proposed by the [Page 1199] UNC were inappropriate and impracticable and that his side could not agree to the third principle and the 4 which follows from it.

“2. Balance of session was spent in defense by UNC delegation of its 3 principle and continuous refutation by Nam Il along the lines indicated above. Among significant statements are the following. ‘We hold that all foreign troops should be withdrawn immediately. We are not attempting to increase our forces, but we oppose any attempt to avoid the withdrawal of troops and hamper final settlement of the Korean problem.’ ‘Your side seeks to discuss problems beyond the scope of a military armistice but related to the withdrawal of troops. By this means you seek to avoid the withdrawal of troops in the future.’

“3. ‘The maintenance of an armistice through the maintenance of a balance of forces is not possible. It lies in the sincerity of both sides, the basic and permanent solution is the withdrawal of troops. We insist on the withdrawal of all foreign troops. Your side under pretext of maintenance of balance of forces seeks to continue a state of war and evade solution of the Korean problem.’

“4. ‘Principles 3 and 4, are beyond scope of 3 item of agenda. They are closely related to withdrawal of troops. Without solving the basic question of withdrawal these questions cannot be settled. Therefore, we completely oppose principles 3 and 4. We insist in carrying on discussion within scope of agenda.’ Repeated several times in varying forms was the statement that principles 3 and 4 cannot be considered until the problem of foreign troops is settled. When pinned down Nam Il stated that ‘withdrawal of foreign troops will settle principles 3 and 4.’

“5. In summary the Commie position is that withdrawal of foreign troops will make UNC principles 3 and 4 unnecessary and so far this is the strong stand of the Communists on agenda item 3. The delegations meet tomorrow 29 November at 1100 hours.

“Sgd Joy.”

  1. Dated November 28, p. 1194.