Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 148: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret   priority

CX–58195. 1. Reurad JCS 84081 and ourad CX 55993.1 Early consideration of item 4 concerning exchange of prisoners of war appears possible. Our present planned procedure is:

a.
To insist upon disclosure of names, numbers, and locations, by nationality, of all United Nations Command prisoners of war held by the Communists. While this would assist us in bargaining more effectively we are convinced that Communists can hold out certain United Nations Command personnel if they so desire merely by deleting names from rosters furnished us. However, such a list is necessary as a basis for subsequent discussions. If Communists insist, we are prepared to furnish rosters to them of all prisoners of war held in United Nations Command custody.
b.
Initially we shall strive for exchange on a one-for-one basis. If Communists accept this proposal and if the number of bona-fide prisoners of war held by the Communists is not increased by Republic of Korea refugees and North Korean civilians, the United Nations Command, holding a vastly greater number of prisoners of war than do the Communists, could hold out from the exchange those persons whose retention seems desirable.
c.
If one-for-one basis is not possible and if it appears necessary to arrive at an expanded ratio of exchange in order to insure the release of the maximum number of United Nations Command personnel or is necessary to prevent breakdown in truce negotiations, we are prepared to agree to any ratio up to and including an all-for-all exchange.
d.
As a means of insuring accomplishment of our primary objective of prompt return of maximum number of United Nations Command prisoners of war, I feel it is essential to authorize the armistice delegation authority to agree, if necessary, to an all-for-all exchange, even though it would mean turning over to Communist control all prisoners of war, including the following categories:3
(1)
Suspected war criminals and witnesses to war crimes.
(2)
Intelligence prospects.
(3)
Individuals who have voluntarily aided United Nations Command.
(4)
All Korean prisoners of war who resided prior to June 1950 South of the 38 parallel and who have not been cleared by Republic of Korea and reclassified as civilian internees.
(5)
Individuals not desiring return to Communist control including:
(a)
The majority of Chinese prisoners of war many of whom have submitted petitions claiming they are loyal ex-Nationalists impressed into Communist Forces.
(b)
Some North Korean prisoners of war.
(c)
Some South Korean prisoners of war of the group referred to in para 1 d (4) above.

2. Information is requested earliest as to policy decisions on each of above points or on any related policies which may affect decisions here.

  1. Dated October 13 and 27, respectively, pp. 1034 and 1068.