Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 141: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of Defense (Foster) to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett), at Rome¹

top secret
operational immediate

Washington, 26 November 1951—8:56 p. m.

Def–88059. Noforn. Personal for Lovett from Foster. There are being repeated to you three messages: Ridgway’s C 52227 of 4 October, GX 3100 of 23 [24] November, and DA 87452 to Ridgway from CSA dated 19 November for your information and background.

In an earlier message Ridgway’s proposed initial position was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you, and the President.² It is necessary to give Ridgway Government’s decision which could be the breaking point of negotiations.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in consultation with Matthews, Bohlen, and others from the State Department have drafted instructions to Ridgway concerning final position he is authorized to take on Item 3 of the Agenda. I have approved the JCS answer which must, of course, be cleared by the President. In discussing this with Mr. Webb, he and I decided that you and Mr. Acheson should be informed of the proposed action. In order that the President be fully briefed on the matter prior to taking final action, it is planned to send General Hull, representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff together with Mr. Matthews from the State Department to Key West on Wednesday, 28 November to present the matter to the President for his approval. Should you or Mr. Acheson desire to comment, please do so promptly.

The following message is to be presented to the President for his approval:

“Reur GX 3100 TAC KCG, dated 23 [24] November. This message in two parts.

Part 1.

“Your general comments in Part One of referenced message indicate that Paragraphs One and Two of DA 87452 fail to convey clearly to you the intent of the JCS. The JCS have never visualized immediate withdrawal of UN Forces from Korea upon conclusion of an Armistice, but instead have held that withdrawal is unrelated to a Military Armistice. The JCS further hold that under appropriate circumstances it may be in the military interests of the US to effect a phased withdrawal of our forces from Korea. However, our primary goal continues to be the attainment of an Armistice satisfactory to the United States.

“In seeking this Armistice the JCS do not desire to curtail planned action on your part which would insure the security of UN Forces. They share your concern in this regard and agree that detailed inspection, as you envisage it, would contribute to this security and is thus essential.

Part 2.

“In view of the foregoing and the desirability of achieving both ground and aerial observation as indicated in JCS 87239,³ the JCS desire that you adopt the position outlined in Part Six, Paragraphs A, B, and C of your C 52227 as your initial position and as amplified by Paragraph One Five of your GX 3100 TAC KCG. It is assumed that prior to formal submission of proposal for inspections, you will have set forth, under Item Three of the Agenda the proposed agreements on buildup, introduction of new equipment etc, in accordance with your basic instructions in our 95354 of 30 June. The JCS are concerned over the possible inadequacy of ground observation teams to maintain surveillance of the airfields of North Korea numbering approximately 100. If you are satisfied that adequate surveillance can be performed from the ground so as to insure against possible surprise air attack originating from North Korean bases, you are also authorized to stand on the final position which you outline in Part Six of your C–52227. If further study of this final position indicates the essentiality of aerial observation, or negotiations with Communists as they develop indicate a modification of your security requirements, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will have to give consideration to possible change in the final position.

“If negotiations are broken off over this issue, the decision to cease discussion of an Armistice must be made by the Communists and not by the UNC.”⁴

1. Mr. Lovett was in Rome for the meeting of the NATO Council, November 24–28. A manuscript note on the source text read: “Copy to Secretary [Acheson] in Rome.”
2. Reference is to telegram JCS 84817, October 23, to Tokyo; see footnote 1 to Emmons’ November 26 memorandum, p. 999.
3. Dated November 16, p. 1142.
4. Telegram Telac 60, November 29, to Rome, informed Mr. Acheson that the proposed directive to General Ridgway was discussed with President Truman on November 28 by General Hull and Mr. Matthews, approved by the President with minor modification, and sent to General Ridgway on the same day (795.00/11–2951); see telegram JCS 88226, November 28, to Tokyo, p. 1193.