795.00/11–2651
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)
Subject: Cease-fire Negotiations in Korea.
| Participants: | Mr. K. R. C. Pridham, Second Secretary, British Embassy |
| Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs | |
| Mr. A. B. Emmons, 3rd., Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs |
Mr. Pridham called on Mr. Johnson at 2 o’clock this afternoon by prior appointment. He explained that the British Foreign Office, on the basis of certain informal discussions in Tokyo by Mr. Boucher, a member of the British diplomatic mission, had inquired of the Embassy in Washington as to our present thinking on the question of inspection under Item 3 of the Panmunjom agenda. The Foreign Office believed, on the basis of this information, that General Ridgway was taking a firmer attitude towards inspection than that originally presented by Mr. Rusk in an earlier conversation with Mr. Tomlinson of the British Embassy. Mr. Pridham recalled that the impression received from Mr. Rusk on that occasion was to the effect that we might be willing to make substantial concessions on the matter of inspection and that Mr. Rusk had intimated that the general thinking of the United States then was that some limited form of “spot” inspection of potential military build-up areas in Korea would suffice; to the Foreign Office it now appeared, however, that General Ridgway has in mind a more elaborate form of inspection, including aerial observation. [Page 1183] Mr. Pridham added that the Foreign Office now wonders whether our current approach to this problem represented a stiffening in our attitude on this point and whether instructions had been sent to General Ridgway concerning this matter.
Mr. Johnson replied that the matter is now under very active discussion between General Ridgway, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department and that instructions of a preliminary nature had been sent to General Ridgway. He explained that what is now contemplated is, first of all, the establishment of an agreement which would prevent a subsequent increase in the general military potential of either side in terms of men or matériel. Once this agreement has been reached, the United States considered it most essential, in the interests of the security of our forces and to prevent a sudden and overwhelming attack by the Communist forces, that an adequate system of inspection be set up to verify the carrying out of such an agreement. We envisage the establishment of a joint group or commission to supervise observance of the terms agreed upon under Item 3 of the agenda; a series of joint inspection teams on both sides of the line would be stationed at ports, rail junctions, airfields and other key points to report to the commission but which would not necessarily be required to travel about. This system of inspection might be supplemented by aerial observation and reconnaissance. Mr. Johnson also pointed out that we were giving thought to what course of action should be taken in the event of a substantial Communist violation of any armistice agreement.
Mr. Pridham wondered whether the importance which we attach to this question might not provide great difficulties with the Communists in reaching agreement on Item 3, resulting in further long drawn-out negotiations. Mr. Johnson stated that this might well be the case but that both General Ridgway and the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the military point of view attach great importance to the necessity for an adequate inspection system.
Mr. Johnson pointed out that in his conversation of November 21 with the British Ambassador, Mr. Matthews had mentioned the relationship of the problems arising under Item 3 of the agenda to the subject of his discussion with the Ambassador. In reply, Mr. Pridham stated that they fully understood this and hoped to have a reply within the next 48 hours. He informed Mr. Johnson in strict confidence that the “departmental position” of the JCS and Foreign Office had been transmitted to Mr. Eden1 and that this position was not favorable to the questions raised by Mr. Matthews in his discussion with the Ambassador, except upon the point of recognizing the principle of retaining [Page 1184] some British Commonwealth forces in Korea following an armistice.
Mr. Johnson stated that as the news ticker this morning bad reported final agreement with the Communists on Item 22 and that we therefore expect Item 3 to come up for discussion within the next day or two, the British views on the questions raised by Mr. Matthews with the British Ambassador should therefore be made available with minimum delay. Mr. Johnson again stressed the emphasis which our military authorities place upon adequate safeguards against a subsequent sudden Communist attack in Korea and also urged upon Mr. Pridham the delicacy of this question and the great damage which could be done should the Communists receive advance information concerning our position on Item 3.
Mr. Pridham asked whether he could give the Foreign Office, as a firm United States position, that which had been outlined by Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson replied that since the matter was still under discussion within the United States Government Mr. Pridham would not be justified in sending such a message at this particular moment, to which Mr. Pridham agreed.3
- Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.↩
- See telegram C–58056, November 26, from Tokyo, p. 1186.↩
- In telegram Tosec 63, November 26, 8:25 p. m., to Rome (not printed), the Department forwarded to Mr. Acheson, who was attending the meeting of the NATO Council, a summary of Mr. Matthews’ conversation with the British Ambassador on November 21 along with the information that London had referred to Mr. Eden an unfavorable recommendation on the “greater sanction” proposal and suggested he try to influence Mr. Eden’s view on the matter (Black Book, Tab 141).↩