Lot 55d128: Black Book, Tab 130: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
operational immediate
GX–3100 TAC KCG. Fol replies to your DA 87452 of 20 [19] Nov 512 in 2 parts.
Part 1. General.
1. While I concur that it is contrary to our military interests to remain tied up indefinitely in Korea, acceptance of this concept hinges largely on the word “indefinitely”.
2.
- a.
- As prev stated in several msgs to you and orally to visiting senior officials, including Generals Bradley and Collins, I view with great anxiety any course of action tending to create in Communist minds a belief that we shall promptly withdraw all or any substantial part of our military forces from Korea upon conclusion of an armistice. I consider withdrawal within 18 months would result in incalculable damage to our military position and national prestige in the Far East. It would constitute complete repudiation of repeated solemn assurances of support of the people of the ROK from the most authoritative US Governmental sources. The resulting abandonment of these people to the savage retaliation of a brutal Communist occupation would, it seems to me, be utterly repugnant to our concept of honor.
- b.
- No promises, no assurances, no international agreements, nothing but the barrier of superior forces will guarantee against such occupation.
3. Moreover, a premature substantial reduction of our military forces would increase the risk of heavy casualties should an enemy major offensive follow.
4. It seems [conclusive therefore that] we face a decision to maintain approximately our present military strength in Korea for the next 12 months, reviewing this decision as a changing situation may justify.
5. If this is to be our decision then the security of our forces becomes the paramount consideration in Korea. In turn then, the extent to which we can, through inspection, obtain timely intelligence of dangerous enemy build-up south of the Manchurian and Soviet borders, will determine the losses we may sustain, if a major hostile effort, particularly one supported by air, should be launched.
6. In this general picture the potential of enemy air is a highly [Page 1174] important factor. The enemy has seriously challenged our air effort south to the Chongchon River. He has compelled suspension of our daylight medium bombing effort north of that line. He has made, and continues to make, a major determined effort to advance jet air to operational bases well south of the Yalu. If and when the time should come that he could advance his air bases throughout Korea, and have his air strength just across Tsu Shima Straits on the south, and La Perouse Strait in the north, as is already the case, then the successful accomplishment of our present primary mission in the Far East—the defense of the Japanese Islands—would be gravely jeopardized in the event of war with the Soviets.
7. The “principle of inspection” is important for these reasons and for yet another. From the beginning of our national negotiations with the USSR in 1946, we insisted in the UN Atomic Energy Commission on the inclusion of essential safeguards in any agreement we might accept, based on “the principle of inspection”.3 So far as I know we have adhered faithfully to that position and still do. Abandonment of it in Korea would weaken our basic position. In fact it points, as do so many other factors, to the clear conclusion that there is no separate solution to the Korean problem. That problem can be solved only within a solution of the USSR problem, from which the Korean problem has derived.
8. “It is the opinion of the UNC Delegation, based on experience and Communist expressions in sub-delegation meetings to date, that the Communists can be expected to prolong negotiations and may even break them off if UNC insists on inspection and observation other than in demilitarized zone.”
9. I, therefore, come to two general conclusions:
- a.
- Insistence on “the principle of inspections” is a vital factor in our armistice negotiations, and
- b.
- The US Government must, without delay, reach and advise me of its decision on this matter, in order that the UNC Delegation may be properly instructed and plan its course.
10. The recent directed action of the UNC Delegation in offering the Communists a proposal with the present line of contact fixed as the military demarcation line for 30 days is more advantageous to the Communists than their proposal of 10 Nov and has, in my opinion, and that of our delegates, substantially weakened our future bargaining potential. I must urge most serious consideration of our view here that the UNC Delegation be given a clear cut decision of how far it can go on agenda item 3 and still be assured of the support [Page 1175] of the US Government. It is particularly debilitating to our prestige and negotiating position to take firm positions, thereby creating widely publicized issues, only to withdraw from our position under pressure.
11. I cannot concur in your view that “the only vital real assurance we have against a resumption of hostilities is the maintenance of sufficient and appropriate military power in the Korean area (not necessarily within Korea) to serve as an effective deterrent to renewed hostilities”. Communist conception of the time factor, the demonstrated difficulty from both logistic and public opinion angles of timely redeployment into Korea following a withdrawal, as well as the grave doubts of our capability for so doing in event Communist air potential should be used to prevent it—all argue against the soundness of this concept.
Part 2. Detailed reply.
12. In my opinion, we should hold firm on our minimum position even to the point where the enemy breaks off negotiations.
13. There can be no question that the presence of the Communist members of joint inspection teams behind our front lines will provide the Communists with more information than they otherwise might have. The amount of additional information they might so obtain, its timeliness, and its net worth to them, are debatable factors.
14. There is no question but that joint inspection teams will give rise to friction and recriminations. These are inevitable consequences of dealings with Communists on any question.
15. My answers to the questions propounded in your paras 4 and 5 follow: With the above as background, the following are answers to questions posed in para 4, urmsg DA 87452.
- a.
- Permanent teams located at ports of entry (ground, air and naval) and at major military installations: 10 from each side. Teams based in the demilitarized zone to accomplish missions within that zone, special missions as directed by the commission, and to act as a reserve pool for emergency replacement of outlying teams: 10 from each side. Roving teams with the mission of visiting the smaller army, air and naval installations: 5 from each side. A total of 40 teams would require that each side furnish a minimum of 80 and a maximum of 120 field grade officers for this purpose. Location of key points: Koreyong; Chongjim; Ch’Osan; Hyesanjim; Manpojin; Sakchu; Sinuiju; Sinanju; Hungnam; Pyongyand; Wonsan; Sariwon; Inchon; Seoul; Yangyang; Shuncju; Taejon; Shonju; Andong; Taegu; Kwangju; Sunchon; and Pusan area.
- b.
- Under optimum conditions it would be better to have both permanently located observer teams and roving teams, both operating under directives of the armistice commission.
- c.
- Controversial matters or incidents observed by members of the observer teams would immediately be referred to the armistice commission.
- d.
- Reports of violations of the armistice would be referred to the armistice commission. In the event the latter was unable to resolve the problem at hand, the commission in turn would refer the problem to the commanders of both sides who would then communicate in an effort to resolve the problem. Such problems or incidents would immediately be reported by CINCUNC to the JCS.
- e.
- The rehabilitation of railroads is considered inevitable in view of the fact that their use is linked with the civil economy. Certain rehabilitation of airfields is inevitable because of the principle of reciprocity. Detection of redeployment of Communist air forces to fields in North Korea would be either by ground observer teams or joint aerial observations as outlined above.
16.
- a.
- I consider unacceptable, from the viewpoint of the security of UN forces, anything less than the “final position” stated in part 6 of my C 52227 of 4 Oct.
- b.
- I recommend approval of this minimum position as a final US Government position on which the UNC Delegations is authorized to break if rejected by the Communists.
17. In view of the rapidity with which armistice negotiations might conceivably now move, information on the action taken on the foregoing recommendations is considered necessary here as a matter of urgency.
- The source text indicated that this message was signed by Ridgway and sent from Advance Headquarters, Eighth U.S. Army in Korea.↩
- Ante, p. 1148.↩
- For related documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. i, pp. 712 ff.↩