Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/11–1951

Memorandum of Conversation, by David M. Key, Adviser to the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

confidential

[Paris,] November 19, 1951.

Subject: Korean Resolution and Allied Questions

Participants:	Secretary of State
	John M. Chang, Prime Minister of Korea
	Dr. Mye-Mook Lee, Korean Minister to London
	Mr. Taik Sang Chang, Vice Chairman Korean Assembly
	Ambassador David Key1
	Miss Ruth Bacon2

Mr. John M. Chang, Prime Minister of Korea, accompanied by Dr. Mye-Mook Lee and Mr. Taik Sang Chang called by appointment on the Secretary at 6:15 p. m. today.

After referring to a recent report received by the U.N. that the cease-fire negotiations were making good progress and remarking that an armistice might, therefore, not be far distant, Mr. Chang observed that the Korean people would be bitterly disappointed if, after all the sacrifices which they have made and the suffering which they have undergone, a political settlement is arrived at which would still leave Korea divided and which would expose South Korea to the same threats and dangers which have existed since 1945. He felt that any such settlement would be tantamount to a defeat and suggested that, since the Communists respected only force, it was essential that the U.N. forces advance further northwards, not so far as the Yalu perhaps, but at least considerably to the north of the present fighting front, some of which lies to the south of the 38th parallel and exposes Seoul to danger. Mr. Chang expressed the opinion that unless such a military advance were made, the U.N.’s negotiating position would be so weak as to hold out virtually no hope for the unification of Korea. In fact, he did not see how a satisfactory political settlement could be expected if an armistice were concluded on the basis of the present front in Korea.

The Secretary assured Mr. Chang that the unification of Korea was an objective which the United States unreservedly supported, and we must continue to “keep plugging at it”. While he did not underestimate the difficulties of overcoming communist objections, he hoped that through the U.N. and through realization of the growing military strength of the democratic states, the Communists would agree to Korean unification as part of a general political settlement. Whether and if so when the Communists were prepared to enter into a general settlement was a decision which rested largely in their hands. With respect to the present armistice negotiations and Mr. Chang’s suggestion that the U.N. military forces seek to advance further up the peninsula, the Secretary pointed out that these were primarily military questions concerning which we must look to General Ridgway for advice and abide largely by his views. General Ridgway strongly favored an armistice based on the present front which he felt was the strongest and most advantageous position for the U.N. forces from a military viewpoint. General Ridgway, moreover, was opposed to any further advance northwards, since this would lengthen the U.N. supply lines, shorten the Communist supply lines and expose the U.N. forces to increasingly heavy air attacks. In these circumstances the Secretary felt it was inappropriate to discuss any further advance northwards.

Mr. Chang then asked whether there was any basis for rumors to the effect that U.S. forces would be withdrawn from Korea if an armistice is concluded. The Secretary said that he had heard of no suggestions of this sort. The Secretary pointed out that if the Communists again resorted to aggression in Korea, after an armistice, there would ensue the gravest consequences.

In reply to a hope expressed by Mr. Chang that economic aid would be extended to Korea for the reconstruction of the country after an armistice is concluded, the Secretary assured him that we would strongly support any U.N. proposals to this end. Mr. Chang referred in this connection to reported friction between UNCURK and UNKRA. The Secretary stated that he was aware of these reports but he was confident that this problem would be straightened out during this session of the General Assembly. With reference to Mr. Chang’s observation that the head of UNKRA had not been spending much time in Korea, the Secretary pointed out that up to now there had not been much for him to do there but that if an armistice were concluded and UNKRA became more active, he was certain that this situation would be corrected.

Mr. Chang next mentioned the serious problem of inflation caused by payments to U.N. forces and the unrestricted printing of currency. He referred to a “partial settlement” already made by the United States in this regard and to negotiations on economic questions currently in progress in Korea. The Secretary replied that Korean economic and financial problems would continue to receive U.S. consideration.

Mr. Chang raised the point whether by dealing with North Koreans in the armistice negotiations this would involve de facto recognition of the North Korean regime. The Secretary replied that it did not nor did the fact that we were at the same time negotiating with Chinese Communists involve de facto recognition of the latter.

Before leaving, Mr. Chang asked what resolution the U.S. Delegation proposed to submit to the General Assembly on the Korean question. The Secretary pointed out that the Korean item was at present the fourth item of business on the First Committee’s agenda and accordingly, much would depend on whether or not there was an armistice when the item came up for consideration. In response to Mr. Chang’s suggestion, the Secretary stated that the U.S. Delegation would be glad to keep in close touch with the Korean representatives as developments occurred. He suggested that Mr. Chang get in touch with Senator Austin and other members of the Delegation dealing with this matter.

There is attached a copy of an aide-mémoire, prepared by Mr. Chang, which was submitted to the Secretary’s office prior to his visit.³

1. Mr. Key was the American Ambassador to Burma.
2. Miss Bacon, United Nations Adviser to the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, was also an Adviser to the U.S. Delegation to the Sixth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.
3. The aide-mémoire, not printed, outlined the Korean position on the points taken up by Prime Minister Chang as set forth in the memorandum of conversation.