Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 116: Telegram
The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Collins) to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)
routine
DA–87452. From CSUSA signed Bolte1 ref C 52227 and C 57217 and JCS 87239.2
1. In view of the possibility of Communist non-acceptance of any really eff insp and obsn mechanism and the resultant possibility of a [Page 1149] breakdown of negotiations on this issue, and recognizing that it is not in the mil interests of the US to be tied up in Korea indefinitely, a most careful assessment of our psn in this regard is required. It would be helpful to the JCS if they had your more detailed views on this subject.
2. As you know, the main purpose of insp and obsn were: (A) To assure against a resumption of hostilities; and (B) to prov for the scty of UN forces. It now appears doubtful that any insp mechanism in itself will attain the former. The only real assurance we have against a resumption of hostilities is the maintenance of suf and aprop mil power in the Korean area (not necessarily within Korea) to serve as an eff deterrent to renewed hostilities. Associated with this is the possibility, as indicated in Para 2 of JCS 87239, of UN issuing an ultimatum to the eff that renewed hostilities will result in punitive action against Communist China itself. However, unless we have reasonable assurance that such punitive action, to include naval blockade and air attacks, would be undertaken and would be supported by other UN participants, we would be reluctant to base the scope of insp on anything other than the mil considerations of scty of UN forces in Korea.
3. The real concern is, of course, the scty of UN forces in Korea if the Communists accept or ignore the risks involved and renew hostilities. While insp and obsn will obviously contribute to this scty by prov more accurate intl, this advantage must be weighed against such factors as: (A) the possibility of a breakdown in negotiations and a renewal of hostilities oil this issue; (B) the possibility of serious friction and incidents stemming from insp; and (C) the prov of better info to the Communists on our own activities, dispositions, etc.
4. In view of these factors your views on the fol are rqst:
- A.
- The nr and, if possible, the location of key points and road or railroad nets in both north and south Korea of which obsn is desirable;
- B.
- Would this obsn be better or more practicable by permanently locating obsr teams in these localities or by having roving teams inves on a spot-check basis?
- C.
- What safeguards or prov are envisaged for preventing or solving any incidents or disagreements?
- D.
- How do you propose to handle repts of violations of the armistice by either side?
- E.
- How do you propose to check on rehab of railroads, roads, and airfields in north Korea? Your present armistice instr do not prov against such rehab. Would such rehab in itself increase unacceptably Communist mil capabilities?
5. Assuming flat rejection by the Communists of the psns indicated in Part 6 of your C 52227 can we acpt anything less from the view point [Page 1150] of scty of UN forces? Would the deterrent factor indicated in Para 2 above coupled with any, or a combination, of the fol be suf to prov reasonable scty:
- A.
- Insp in demilitarized zone only.
- B.
- Insp in a zone on the order of 20–30 miles centered on the demarcation line.
- C.
- Periodic spot-checks of spec locales in Korea by the Mil Armistice Commission.
- D.
- Joint aerial obsn.
- E.
- Intensification and expansion of covert intel activities.
6. Rqst your views on the foregoing and on any other allied problems and considerations which might assist the JCS in determining a final psn on this subj.