Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 93: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

secret   priority

Tokyo, 14 November 1951—8:05 p. m.

C–57272. For your info CINCUNC Adv msg HNC 451 is quoted.

“1. Subdelegation report on meeting of 14 Nov 1951 fol:

“a. UNC opened the session by querying Communists as to how Commie proposal would prevent a breakoff of negotiations at the last minute, or prevent stalling in order to obtain a favorable line of contact, objections which they had raised to the UNC proposal. Communists stated that agreement on military demarcation line in the solution of this item of the agenda would constitute a ‘de facto cease fire;’ that this was an ‘unavoidable result’ of agenda item 2. They still insisted that changes in the line of contact after agreement on the military demarcation line would be reflected in revisions to be made prior to the signing of the armistice although if one side tried to make changes in accordance with their legal right it would be an indication of bad faith and insincerity and prove that that side did not want an armistice.

“b. UNC repeatedly asked whether this de facto cease fire was expected to apply to Air and Navy as well as ground. Communists finally indicated, without specifically so stating, that they expected a complete cease fire on the ground, in the air and at sea as a demonstration of our good faith. Chinese representative delivered lengthy tirade in which he asserted that our former proposals necessarily included a de facto cease fire and that this was because we would have gotten all that we wanted by negotiations; that under our present proposal we intend to get by force of arms what we had been unable to win by negotiations. His statement was replete with accusations that UNC did not desire to end hostilities and with anger directed at UNC position, that in order to preclude stalling on other items UNC would not put itself in a position where it could not continue to conduct military operations up until such time as a complete armistice is agreed upon and signed.

“c. Communists said the de facto cease fire would have no binding legal repeat but that any military activities of either side after agreement on item 2 was reached would be an indication of the sincerity of that side’s desire for an armistice; but that it was to meet UNC insistence on the right to continue hostilities that they had included the third paragraph in their proposal.

“d. UNC asserted that Communists proposal had apparently been purposely drawn so as to be open to the construction now being given it while not so stating on the surface; pointed out that it had required many questions over several days, the answers to all of which had been evasive prior to this morning to bring the Communists’ intent out in the open; and stated that UNC wanted an armistice, but that it wanted a complete one, including all of the items on the agenda, and it did not want to set up a situation whereby those other items might never be solved.

“e. Communists representatives summarized their position substantially as follows: Their proposal contemplates a de facto cease fire by all arms; however, this is based on good faith only and is not legally binding; in order to allow scope for UNC ‘military adventures’, the third paragraph was added to their proposal; after agreement on item 2, the UNC may change the line of contact in accordance with its military ability; this is equally applicable to both sides; and clarification of proposal was given today only in order to refute our ‘distorted press propaganda.’

“f. It is belief of subdelegation that Communists are pressing for a complete cease fire at the time agenda Item 2 only is agreed to. If they get such a cease fire they will proclaim bad faith if any hostile military operations of any kind are conducted thereafter regardless of delays or outcome on remainder of agenda items. Careful reading of the principle in the first paragraph of their proposal of 10 November permits such interpretation but only during today’s discussions have these points been brought out in the open.

“2. Subdelegations meet again at 1100 on 15 November. Sgd Joy.”