Office of the Historian

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 98: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

top secret
operational immediate
Washington, 14 November 1951—5:57 p. m.

JCS–86969. From JCS.

1. JCS appreciate views expressed in ur C 572161 and recognize that there are certain disadvantages involved in undertaking action directed in JCS 86804.2 However, from the broader viewpoint, they feel these disadvantages are outweighed by the desirability of early agreement on agenda item 2.

2. Specifically, JCS feel:

a.
That Communist proposal generally meets our basic position re demilitarized zone, namely, defense of Kansas line, and, in addition, provides protection for Wyoming line and the recently improved logistical support of X Corps. Hence agreement with it is no concession on our part.
b.
That no major change in our favor in present line of contact likely in next month (reur CX 57143).3
c.
That mil pressure on Communists neither will nor should be lessened.
d.
That agreement on this agenda item, which apparently of prime importance to Communists, might well expedite agreement on other items rather than retard them, particularly if we maintain mil pressure.

3. JCS reaffirm the necessity for agreeing upon all proper arrangements for cessation of hostilities as contained in Armistice terms, before any form of cease fire is acceded to. (See subpara g, part II, JCS 95438, Jul 51).4

[Page 1132]

4. Accordingly, JCS desire that you undertake action indicated in JCS 86804. They recognize that certain preparatory work may be necessary; however, they desire that this be done without undue delay.

  1. Dated November 13, p. 1128.↩
  2. Dated November 13, p. 1126.↩
  3. Not printed. In it, General Ridgway had transmitted a directive of November 12 to General Van Fleet to assume a posture of “active defense” in Korea. Along the outline of present positions, U.N. forces were to seize the terrain most suitable for defense, while limiting offensive actions to those involving commitment of no more than one division. At the same time, the Eighth Army was to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy as favorable opportunities arose. (See Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p. 176.)↩
  4. Dated July 2, p. 611.↩