Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 83: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
emergency
C–57216. Ref JCS 86804.1
1. Rqst reconsideration of your directive to press for early settlement of agenda item 2 on basis of present line of contact with provision that agreement remains valid only under conditions of full settlement of all agenda items within a specified period of time. As a matter of deep conviction, I feel it is imperative that we continue our positive efforts to obtain agreement on a demilitarized zone based on the line of contact existing at the time of the signing of the armistice.
2. In every instance in which the UNC delegation has been permitted to stand pat on their requirements there has been eventual agreement by the Communists. I feel this is specially pertinent at this time and that continued patience and resistance will gain us this point of extreme importance.
3. During the 12 Nov session of the sub-delegations the UNC representatives offered to delete, if objectionable to the Communists, the provision for requiring minor local adjustments in the line of contact existing at the time of signing the armistice. This was done in order to eliminate not only the subj of minor adjustments but to ease the Communist sensitivity regarding Kaesong. The Communists evidenced no interest in this offer. All concerned here feel that Communist insistence on their proposal is based on a belief that once a line has been accepted the UNC will not be in a psn to engage in any ground activity which would necessitate the taking of casualties, [Page 1129] thereby granting the Communists the benefits of an effective ground cease fire even though there would be no signed armistice. This may be because they expect to delay indefinitely on subsequent agenda items or simply to increase their bargaining powers in the remainder of the negotiations because of lessening mil pressure on them.
4. The vital difference between the UNC and Communist proposals rests in the intent behind the Communist insistence on a demarcation line based on the present line of contact despite their pretended agreement that the present battle line has no legal relevance for the final settlement of Item 2. The fol excerpts from a statement made by Hodes at the sub-delegation meeting of 12 Nov stress the instability of the Communist position and give the basic reason for my belief that the Communists must eventually concede our psn:
- a.
- “Why do you want to designate now the demarcation line and zone that will have no legal relevance at the time the armistice is signed and has no function prior to that time?
- b.
- “We have proposed that the mil demarcation line be identical with the line of contact as it exists when the armistice is about to be signed. Since the location of this line cannot be known until that time there is no add step that can be taken now. At least none that is honestly motivated.
- c.
- “Both parties have agreed that this demarcation line shall be the battle line as it exists at the end of the armistice talks. Since this line does not now exist it is manifestly impossible to be more concrete and specific than to specify everything needed to determine it at the approp time.
- d.
- “Why do you want to create a provisional demarcation line now that has no function and which you agree will be discarded at the end of the armistice talks?”
5. I feel that premature acceptance of the present line of contact, under any conditions of adjustment, or requirements connected with completion of other agenda items, must inevitably delay the possibility of obtaining an acceptable and honorable armistice. I feel there is substantial probability that announcement to the Communists of the course you have directed will increase Communist intransigence and weaken our future psns on every substantive point. Having grown up with this developing situation, I have a strong inner conviction, admittedly based on the Korean as contrasted with the world situation, that more steel and less silk, more forthright American insistence on the unchallengeable logic of our psn, will yield the objectives for which we honorably contend. Conversely, I feel that the course you are directing will lead step by step to sacrifice of our basic principles and repudiation of the cause for which so many gallant men have laid down their lives. We stand at a crucial point. We have much to gain by [Page 1130] standing firm. We have everything to lose through concession. With all my conscience I urge we stand firm.
6. Since your directive does not require compliance at any specified date, I therefore respectfully rqst reconsideration of your directive in JCS 86804.