Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 91: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

secret   priority

Tokyo, 13 November 1951—11:22 p. m.

HNC–446. For info CINCUNC (Adv) HNC 446.

“Sub-delegation reports as follows on 13 November meeting:

• “a. Main argument Commies used against UNC proposal of 10 November was that it did not meet agenda item 2 requirements and proposal was therefore illegal. UNC sub-delegation refuted this argument, offered eliminate phrase ‘minor local adjustments’ but Commies not interested.
• “b. Communists propounded questions designed to ascertain whether UNC would be willing to stop fighting on the present line of contact. When advised that location of any cease fire line would depend upon the location of the line of contact when armistice was signed Communists asked why our present proposal differed from our previous ones in not providing a present line and zone. It was again explained that our previous proposals were based upon adjusted lines which had to be specifically spelled out while the present proposal is based exclusively on the line of contact as it may exist on the date of the signing of the armistice and therefor requires no predetermination.
• “c. A UNC query as to whether Communists expected a withdrawal and cease fire to follow immediately upon the reaching of agreement on item 2 alone was given equivocal answer which indicated no intent to require immediate withdrawal but avoided reference to cease fire. An indicated objection to our proposal was the fear that disputes on the location of the line of contact at time of signing of armistice would possibly result in UNC breaking off negotiations at that late date with the obvious implication that under their proposal unresolved disputes on proposed revisions would still leave the agreed provisional military demarcation line as the one to be used in the armistice agreement.
• “d. Communists representative stated that they would not accept our proposal and that as long as we refused to state in what area the fighting would cease no armistice would be possible. Communists advanced the further objection to our proposal that under it we would be able to delay final agreement on the armistice until the line of contact was most favorable to us. Of course this argument also applicable to Communists proposal.
• “e. Communists repeatedly demanded that United Nations Command state now, in solution to item 2, the line at which it desires the fighting to stop, insisting that this would have followed from any of our previous proposals. UNC sub-delegation repeatedly stated that fighting would stop when complete armistice was agreed to and on the line of contact at that time. Further stated that establishment demilitarized zone now on present line of contact would encourage delay in agreement on subsequent agenda items. The important point is achievement of complete armistice agreement earliest.
• “f. Both Communist delegates appeared to lose their tempers, perhaps intentionally, as the meeting continued for 5 hours without a recess.
• “g. The UNC sub-delegation has been unable to unearth the real reason for the Communists’ refusal to accept our proposal. However, whatever it may be, it is of high importance to them since their stated objections, while completely illogical, are gaining in vehemence and vituperativeness.

“2. Sub-delegations meet again at 1100 hours 14 November.

“Joy.”¹

1. The following additional comment was transmitted from Admiral Joy in Korea to General Ridgway in Tokyo on November 14 and forwarded to Washington for the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

   “Following is supplementary to HNC 446 dtd 13 Nov 51:

   • “1. Re para 1 d, Communists concern that UNC is attempting to set stage for reaching objective through mil action which cannot be reached through negotiations, is complete reversal of previous attitude. In discussing UNC proposals of 27 Jul, 25 Oct and 10 Nov Communists boastfully accused UNC of trying to gain objectives at conference table which they had been unable to gain militarily.
   • “2. Communists asserted that UNC must either give up present proposal or formally propose revision of agenda placing present item 2 in last place. UNC Subdelegation insists that agenda revision neither nec nor desired.” (Black Book, Tab 92; Telegram HNC 448)