Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/11–751

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)¹

top secret

[Washington,] November 7, 1951.

Subject: JCS Comments on Position Paper “Courses of Action in Korea in the Event No Armistice is Achieved”

For your advance information I am sending you a copy of suggested changes in the pessimist paper presented yesterday by Defense representatives in the Steering Group for US–UK talks. These changes were presented orally as having been decided by the JCS but not yet concurred in by the Department of Defense. We are informed that if the JCS proposals are approved by the Secretary of Defense they will presumably be transmitted formally to the NSC in response to the request for a review of the Korean problem. Consequently, we will probably have cognizance of the JCS comments only when presented to the NSC.²

You will note that there are two problems which will require the most careful consideration. One is a direct proposal for the imposition of a naval blockade of Communist China. The other that U.S. Air Forces unilaterally bomb Chinese air bases whenever enemy activities are on such a scale as to jeopardize the security of U.S. forces.

From conversations with Pentagon officers it is understood that the intent of the latter proposal is to take the decision to bomb Chinese bases without waiting for an attack if there is such a buildup in Chinese offensive air strength, viz., bombers, as to justify the conclusion that a Chinese air offensive in sufficient strength to jeopardize the security of our forces, particularly our air bases, is imminent. It is apparently the intent that the decision as to whether circumstances require such action would remain in Washington.

[Attachment]

top secret

[Washington, November 6, 1951.]

Courses of Action in Korea in the Event No Armistice Is Achieved³

problem

1.…

General Courses of Action

2. Military Actions.

a. The United States should:

(1) …

(2) Direct [the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command] CINCUNC to increase [immediately] the scale of military operations in the Korean [campaign to the maximum] area consistent with the capabilities [and security] of the forces [now available or made] available to him whenever in his judgment such operations will contribute materially toward the destruction of enemy forces and will not result in a disproportionate loss to the UN forces under his command;

(3) Impose no restrictions on advances into North Korea [at least to the neek of the North Korean Peninsula];

(4) …

(5) …

(6) …

(7) Remove all restrictions against air attacks in North Korea including restrictions against attacks on the Yalu River dams and the power installations on the Korean bank of the Yalu River[. Air attacks on Rashin should continue in accordance with existing instructions of the JCS and UN aircraft should continue to remain well clear of the USSR border];

(8) Take the necessary [UN and] diplomatic measures for [looking toward] the imposition of a naval and an economic blockade of Communist China [and re-examine the political feasibility of a naval blockade. (The exact wording of this paragraph is still being considered by the State and Defense Departments. The above wording is a State Department proposal .)];

(9) …

b.…

Add the following new paragraph under 2a:

“Employ U.S. Air Forces unilaterally and on short notice if the situation so requires to attack certain Chinese communist air bases whenever the scale of these activities is such as to seriously jeopardize the security of the U.S. forces in the Korean area.”

1. Addressed to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews), the Counselor (Bohlen), the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze), and the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson).
2. See NSC 118, November 9, p. 1106.

3. The text of document NOV–3, October 25, to which these proposed changes were directed, differed from the text of document WFM T–10/1a, September 8 p. 889) only in Paragraph 2a (8), as indicated here, and in the second sentence of Paragraph 3d, which read in NOV–3, as follows: “The imposition of a naval blockade, through action in the United Nations, is probably politically infeasible; from the military point of view, however, a naval blockade of Communist China is both feasible and highly desirable.” (Lot 59D95, Box 99) See the enclosure to the letter to Acheson from Lovett, p. 912.

   NOV–3 was not used for the U.S.–U.K. talks in Paris in early November, since Korea was not taken up at these talks. The question of Korea did come up for brief and general discussion only at the tripartite meeting of U.S., U.K., and French Foreign Ministers on November 9 (Lot 59D95, Box 99).