795.00/11–751
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)1
Subject: JCS Comments on Position Paper “Courses of Action in Korea in the Event No Armistice is Achieved”
For your advance information I am sending you a copy of suggested [Page 1094] changes in the pessimist paper presented yesterday by Defense representatives in the Steering Group for US–UK talks. These changes were presented orally as having been decided by the JCS but not yet concurred in by the Department of Defense. We are informed that if the JCS proposals are approved by the Secretary of Defense they will presumably be transmitted formally to the NSC in response to the request for a review of the Korean problem. Consequently, we will probably have cognizance of the JCS comments only when presented to the NSC.2
You will note that there are two problems which will require the most careful consideration. One is a direct proposal for the imposition of a naval blockade of Communist China. The other that U.S. Air Forces unilaterally bomb Chinese air bases whenever enemy activities are on such a scale as to jeopardize the security of U.S. forces.
From conversations with Pentagon officers it is understood that the intent of the latter proposal is to take the decision to bomb Chinese bases without waiting for an attack if there is such a buildup in Chinese offensive air strength, viz., bombers, as to justify the conclusion that a Chinese air offensive in sufficient strength to jeopardize the security of our forces, particularly our air bases, is imminent. It is apparently the intent that the decision as to whether circumstances require such action would remain in Washington.
- Addressed to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews), the Counselor (Bohlen), the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze), and the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson).↩
- See NSC 118, November 9, p. 1106.↩
-
The text of document NOV–3, October 25, to which these proposed changes were directed, differed from the text of document WFM T–10/1a, September 8 p. 889) only in Paragraph 2a (8), as indicated here, and in the second sentence of Paragraph 3d, which read in NOV–3, as follows: “The imposition of a naval blockade, through action in the United Nations, is probably politically infeasible; from the military point of view, however, a naval blockade of Communist China is both feasible and highly desirable.” (Lot 59D95, Box 99) See the enclosure to the letter to Acheson from Lovett, p. 912.
NOV–3 was not used for the U.S.–U.K. talks in Paris in early November, since Korea was not taken up at these talks. The question of Korea did come up for brief and general discussion only at the tripartite meeting of U.S., U.K., and French Foreign Ministers on November 9 (Lot 59D95, Box 99).
↩