Office of the Historian

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 57: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

top secret
operational immediate
Washington, 6 November 1951—6:27 p. m.

JCS–86291. From JCS.

1. Ur C 56546, CX 56598, C 56601, C 56667 and C 56713 considered.1

2. Line of action as described in CX 56598 considered sound.

3. In support of your contentions in CX 56598 re Kaesong JCS feel that line in this area proposed by Communists is one which we would rather accept than let negotiations break down or reach a stalemate. Consequently, if Communists flatly reject your latest approach and negotiation on this point appears fruitless, the quicker we accept a [Page 1093] compromise the less it will appear as an important backdown both here and as far as Communist propaganda is concerned.

4. Throughout we have taken as basic principle that demarkation line should be generally along battle line. Communists now appear to have accepted this principle. We feel that in general this adequately meets our minimum position re demilitarized zone.

5. Judging from press reaction here it would be hard to make the people understand why negotiations broke down, if such should happen, over Kaesong in face of recent Communist concessions. This fact has been mentioned several times in last few days both on radio and in press.

6. If your latest proposal to postpone agreement on a line of mil demarkation and demilitarized zone is rejected completely by Chinese-NK delegation, and further negotiation along this approach appears fruitless, early agreement generally along proposed Chinese-NK line in Kaesong area is advisable.

7. However, JCS are concerned over latest Communist proposal as expressed in C 56713 since agreement to such a proposal would have practical effect of curtailing further UN ground advances beyond agreed line of contact. This would be militarily unacceptable unless agreement on all other agenda items also was reached shortly thereafter. Accordingly, although latest Communist proposal insofar as location of demilitarized zone is concerned meets our basic position and is thus acceptable, such acceptance must be qualified by a time limitation for completion of all agenda items, preferably a definite period in which major forward UN ground operations are not otherwise contemplated. It would be stipulated that in the event agreement is not reached on all agenda items within the definite period specified, location of the demilitarized zone is subject to revision. Your comments are requested ASAP.2

  1. Dated respectively, November 3, 4, 4, 5, and 6, pp. 1086, 1087, 1089, 1090, and 1091.↩

  2. General Ridgway transmitted the following reply in his telegram C–56767, November 7, from Tokyo:

    “Am forwarding your JCS 86291 to Adm Joy immediately. I plan to spend tomorrow night, 8 November, in Korea. Will discuss this msg with Adm Joy at that time and submit my views to you soonest thereafter.” (Black Book, Tab 58)

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