Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 52: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CX–56598. HNC–423. “The Communists again today, 4 Nov, stood firm against the inclusion of Kaesong in the UNC area or in the demilitarized zone. The principle upon which their proposal is based is a strict battle line solution with minor adjustments or even no adjustments. This principle has the appearance of being equitable in all respects and will no doubt have strong appeal to public opinion. The Communists may be relying on the pressure of public opinion to force UNC acceptance of their proposal before they are forced by the passage of time or by military pressure to recede from their position.
[Page 1088]“The longer we insist upon the inclusion of Kaesong in the demilitarized zone the more damaging it would be to withdraw to a less desirable solution. It would result not only in greater loss of prestige, but it would encourage Communists to hold out on other points with the expectation of forcing the UNC to withdraw therefrom.
“We may now be faced with the necessity of waiting a long period for a Communist compromise as an alternative to our agreement to a battle line solution with minor modifications. Since we may be required by higher authority within a short period to abandon our objective of retaining Kaesong or placing it in the neutral zone, we recommend that we agree on 5 Nov to the principle of settlement on the battle line with appropriate (minor, if necessary) adjustments and that we proceed therefrom as indicated in the following statement.
“There are 2 proposals before the sub-delegations, one presented by the United Nations comd, the other by the other side. Both are based upon the line of ground contact with appropriate adjustments. However, they are based upon different and unilateral versions of that line as there is no agreed line. Both proposals recognize that inasmuch as the military demarcation line is based upon the line of contact provision must be made for altering the location of the demilitarized zone to give recognition to any changes in the line of contact resulting from military operations which may transpire between the present date and the signing of the armistice.
“The sub-delegations, therefore, have agreed to a principle according to which the location of the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone can be determined. That is, that they will be based upon the line of ground contact with appropriate adjustments. In view of the current lack of agreement on the line of ground contact we can go no further than this at the present time. In view of the probability of changes in the line of ground contact between the present and the signing of the armistice there is no need for determining the exact location of the demilitarized zone at this time, indeed, there is no advantage in attempting to refine our agreement further at the present time. All that is needed is to make such arrangements as will provide an agreed line of contact when such a line is required just before the overall agreement is finalized. The exact location of the line of contact is susceptible to objective determination. It can be located to the satisfaction of both sides by appropriate means such as the establishment of a commission made up of officers from both sides to visit points in the battle area where the location of the line of contact is in dispute. In view of these considerations and in order that progress towards solution of all the questions involved in bringing about the cessation of warfare in Korea may not be stalemated during the solution of a technical question the following formal proposal is hereby submitted:
[Page 1089]“The sub-delegations agree:
“1. To accept the principle that the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone will be based upon the actual line of ground contact at the time of the signing of the armistice with appropriate adjustments.
“2. To establish a committee consisting of 2 officers from each side the function of which shall be to determine to the satisfaction of both sides the actual line of contact as of any specific future date and to be prepared to provide to the delegations such an agreed line at such time as it may be needed for the purpose of accurately determining the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone prior to finalization of armistice agreements.
“3. To report their agreements to the plenary session of the delegations with the recommendation that the latter proceed to the discussion of other items on the agenda leaving the finalization of the agreement on agenda item 2. Until such time as it is possible to settle it definitely in order to reach agreement in all questions related to an armistice in Korea at the earliest possible date. ‘Under the UNC proposal the delegations will be enabled to proceed with the other questions related to the armistice while the bilateral committee undertakes its function of developing that which is a prerequisite to final agreement on agenda item 2; that is, an agreed contact line.’
[“] Should the Communists fail to accept this proposal it may serve nevertheless to help to bring about a compromise on Kaesong. Should they accept it, the difference over Kaesong will be submerged for the present in the discussion of other problems. Meanwhile the passage of time, the approach of cold weather and continued military operations (at least air, Navy and arty), will exert their pressures. Thus, when the question of Kaesong comes up again we may be in a stronger position than we are at present to argue for its retention or demilitarization as an appropriate adjustment. Sgd Joy”
I have granted authority to Admiral Joy to proceed as outlined above.