Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/11–251

Memorandum by H. O. H. Frelinghuysen and Walter Treumann of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs

top secret

[Washington,] November 2, 1951.

Subject: Item No. 3 of the Armistice Agenda

Recommendations:

It is recommended that:

(1) General Ridgway’s proposal, contained in CINCUNC’s C52227¹ remain our initial position in the negotiations on Item 3.

(2) In the event that negotiations threaten to break down on this proposal this Government adopt as its minimum position on Item 3 “joint inspection of the demilitarized area.”

(3) The following additional provisions be considered as desirable lesser alternatives, which are not essential but which could be used for bargaining purposes:

(a) Inspection teams located at strategic points within an area 100 miles each side of the demarcation line with necessary rail, air and sea access to their own area. This provision would avoid Communist opposition to inspection along the Sino-Soviet border and our opposition to inspection in the Pusan area.

(b) Reciprocal aerial and naval inspection of all of Korea.

(c) Failing agreement on (a) or (b) reference of the subject of inspection and supervisory machinery to a special armistice committee which might continue the discussion after the termination of hostilities for the purpose of arranging periodic inspections of vital areas.

(4) In the event that recommendation (2) is accepted as governmental policy, preparatory propaganda action be taken to obtain the full support of ROK, US and UN public opinion and at the same time to demonstrate to the Communists that our failure to insist on inspection in no way lessens our determination to resist any renewed aggression.

Discussion:

Item 3 on the Armistice Agenda provides for concrete arrangements for the realization of the cease-fire and armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority and functions of a supervising organization for carrying out the terms of a cease-fire and armistice”. CINCUNC’s message C52227, October 4, suggests modifications to JCS message 95354 of June 30 on the same subject.

According to CINCUNC’s C52227 the purpose of inspection is to insure that “there is no buildup of troops or supplies in such significant quantities as would, if continued, substantially impair the security of the UN forces, as that security existed when the armistice became effective.” Although the only real deterrent to a renewed attack in Korea is the strength of the free world and its determination to resist aggression, inspection is designed to serve as an additional deterrent to Communist aggression and to gather intelligence which could give UN forces sufficient time to prepare against an enemy attack.

Since the Communist mode of operation is basically opposed to the concept of inspection or supervision in the satellite areas and since Communist negotiators may adamantly oppose inspection in north Korea and thereby risk the break-down of the armistice talks, consideration should be given to the question whether and to what extent an inspection of north Korea can actually accomplish these purposes and what concomitant advantages we could derive from the inspection.

The presence of joint inspection teams in north Korea would be of some value in inhibiting preparations for renewed Communist aggression. The mere fact of their being in north Korea might deter the more flagrant violations of the cease-fire terms. Their report to the UN of Communist violations might rally the free world into taking defensive measures—short of military action—to meet the new threat. Such reports would also have a propaganda value in pointing up Communist bad faith and aggressive intentions.

Joint inspection teams would contribute to the acquisition of intelligence, thereby keeping the UN Command apprised of Communist capabilities and intentions. This factor might also have a deterring effect on Communist aggressive designs.

Inspection teams would provide an added sense of security to the Republic of Korea and might lessen somewhat the opposition of the Korean Government and people to a cease-fire in a divided Korea.

However, the accomplishment of the purposes for which inspection under Item 3 was designed will be severely limited by a number of serious weaknesses. Even in the event of a Communist buildup and reports of the inspection teams to the UN to that effect, it would be most difficult to earn UN support for taking the military initiative in renewing hostilities and smashing the buildup. By its very nature the UN would probably have to wait for an overt act of aggression before taking military countreaction. Failure of the UN to initiate punitive action might be interpreted as a sign of its weakness, would tend to vitiate the propaganda and psychological advantages derived from the inspection reports, and might encourage the Communists to commit further violations.

In the event of Communist bad faith it is doubtful that the presence of the inspection teams could assure against a Communist buildup. The Communists would probably neither permit teams of sufficient size nor grant them adequate freedom of movement and observation to prevent surreptitious evasion of the armistice terms. Moreover, the Communists could increase their military capabilities by building up storage areas, repairing airfields, and rebuilding their lines of communications under the guise of civilian rehabilitation.

UN members of inspection teams would be under constant administrative difficulties in north Korea, since Communists would make every effort to hamstring and embarrass them. In case the Communists wanted a particular area free from inspection they would undoubtedly find ways to prevent free access to the teams and thereby impede the acquisition of intelligence. The inability to define in advance the exact functions of the teams would make for additional difficulties. In event of Communist efforts to embarrass the teams the prestige of the UN might be adversely affected.

The presence of Communist inspectors in south Korea might impede our attempts to rebuild the ROK forces. In this case the USSR, Communist China and north Korea could utilize reports from their observers in south Korea to point up the “aggressive designs” of the ROK and pave the way for an attempted justification of what they would term a “defensive” buildup of Communist forces in north Korea. Communist inspectors would also derive a broad range of intelligence about our forces in the ROK, particularly if they were stationed in the Pusan area. There would be inevitable friction between Communist observers and the ROK Government, since the latter would probably make every effort to circumscribe the activities of the teams.

Unless the provisions for inspection can be so strengthened in the negotiations as to eliminate these weaknesses and unless definite punitive provisions are written into the agreement to assure its implementation, inspection would probably not adequately fulfill the purposes for which it is designed. From a political point of view, we should be wary of committing ourselves to a course of action whose implementation would be accompanied by innumerable embarrassing incidents; whose enforcement through a renewal of hostilities would be difficult to justify, would necessitate renewed fighting, thus increasing the threat of World War III, and be a source of friction with our allies; and whose non-enforcement would adversely affect the prestige of the UN. From the practical standpoint, the ultimate sanction against a renewal of the aggression is not the presence of inspection teams in north Korea but the clear likelihood that renewed fighting cannot and will not be limited in scope as the present hostilities have been.

It is therefore not believed that we should insist so rigidly on our initial bargaining position (C52227) as to risk the break-down of the armistice talks and a continuation of hostilities. A final governmental decision on this question must, of course, also rest on an assessment by the Department of Defense of the military value of inspection and its effect on the security of the United Nations forces.

It must be recognized that any subsequent modification of our position on Item 3 might result in an unfavorable reaction by American public opinion, segments of which may consider inspection necessary to the security of the UN forces and may charge appeasement, particularly if a renewed Communist attack threatens our military position. Every effort will therefore have to be made to publicize the reasons for our stand and to emphasize the adverse consequences of a break-down of the armistice talks—whether the result is a prolonged period of indecisive conflict or a widening of the area of hostilities.²

1. Dated October 4, p. 997.

2. On November 5, U. Alexis Johnson forwarded this memorandum to Messrs. Matthews, Hickerson, Bohlen, and Nitze under cover of a brief memorandum which read in part as follows:

   “I am circulating this memo for your concurrence or comments in the hope that we can arrive quickly at a Departmental position. I believe that we should consider carefully the method and timing of our presentation of this position to Defense.”

   The question of inspection was taken up at a State–JCS meeting on November 16; see p. 1141.