Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 47: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
operational immediate
C–56388. HNC 413. “UNC delegation expects to use substance of following statement in responding to Communist proposal today.
“Yesterday, when you described your proposal it seemed that we might be close to an agreement. You would have us believe that you have made generous concessions to our side and that therefore your proposal should be acceptable. A proposal is not made acceptable because it represents concessions from a position that was patently absurd in the first place. A proposal cannot be made acceptable by virtue of such changes. It is acceptable or unacceptable in terms of its [Page 1080] contents if these are inequitable, no comparison with a previous proposal will make them equitable.
“Some of the inequities of your proposal undoubtedly arise from your conception of the battle line. I am not particularly concerned about these at the moment. When we have reached fundamental agreement, it will not be too difficult to settle these battle line differences.
“Examination of the proposal discloses, that your statement does not fit your proposal. You said that the 4-kilometer zone was centered on the line of contact. In fact, it is not near the line of contact in many places. In general, it is south of the line of contact.
“You said that you had made adjustments to the line of contact to obtain your demilitarized zone. You did make adjustments. You adjusted the Kosong, Kumsong and Kaesong areas of the demilitarized zone into our positions. This is not a satisfactory adjustment.
“Your proposal requires our forces to withdraw while your forces advance. This is not equitable.
“Your proposal does not take into consideration the many factors pertaining to the Kaesong area which are all very important in the determination of the demilitarized zone:
“This area is of vital concern to the defense of Seoul. This was one of the two main routes through which troops poured in June, 1950 when Seoul fell. Our side has no intention of leaving this Capital City with less natural defense than it had when it was originally attacked in 1950. The UNC mechanized forces were in Kaesong at the time an Armistice Conference at this site was agreed to. The UNC withdrew from this area for the specific purpose of turning it into a neutral zone. You moved your troops into the area and have attempted to treat this area as one which you gained by military action. Despite this, the UNC has in its own proposal offered territorial compensation to a degree more than equitable if you consider the manner in which you acquired this area in July, 1951.
“You stated that the areas from which both sides withdraw are approximately equal in size. The map which you gave to us shows that we withdraw 644 square kilometers while you only withdraw 85 square kilometers. The statements that you use in describing your demilitarized zone are, therefore, misleading and inaccurate.
“Since your solution is not an equitable nor fair solution to the problem, it is not acceptable.
“However, it is a great step forward.
“There are still many problems connected with agenda Item 2. There are some areas in our two proposed zones which are not far apart and it is likely that we could easily come to an agreement on those areas. There are other areas in your zone which are not satisfactory and which cannot be accepted.
“Before discussing the zone in detail, I should like to point out that [Page 1081] your demilitarized zone in the Kaesong area is neither just nor objective. Your zone ignores the many factors pertaining to the arrangements of the Conference site, which has effected the line of contact. It is actually far south of the line of contact.
“You would have our forces withdraw unilaterally from the Kosong and Kumsong areas without corresponding withdrawals by your forces. You assert that the areas from which our side would withdraw are mainly in the jutting out parts of the battle line. In effect, you tell us that, in those places where our forces made large advances, they should now withdraw without corresponding adjustment.
“You have not taken into consideration other areas from which we withdraw. If our forces are to be withdrawn from the Islands off the coast of North Korea, that fact must be taken into consideration in determining the location of the demilitarized zone. If they are not to be withdrawn, the United Nations Command would not ask for any adjustments due to the Islands. What consideration we give to the Islands is, therefore, dependent upon whether or not the United Nations Command Forces are to withdraw from those coastal Islands.
“The Armistice Conference has affected the movement of troops in the Kaesong area. This factor must be taken into consideration in the allocation of the demilitarized zone. The effects of the security arrangements of the Kaesong area have had a significant effect on the location of the line of contact. It is not a factor which can be ignored.
“These are general objections to your proposal.
“Both sides reserve the right to amend the demilitarized zone if there are any significant changes in the line of contact. Both sides maintain that their zones are based on the line of contact. Both sides are willing to accept a zone 4 kilometers wide.
“The points that I have discussed are of fundamental importance. We are still a long distance from an agreed solution to Item 2 of the agenda. Your full and clear appreciation of this is our best hope of real progress.”