Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 46: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
HNC 411. “Sub-delegation reports as follows on 31 Oct meeting: General Hsieh Fang did major part of talking in morning attempting to disprove our claims to Kaesong area. Not once did he or Lee mention Communist proposal. Indications were that the only objections to our proposal were 2: Our insistence on Kaesong area and the overall inequality in withdrawals and advances. UNC delegates presented all arguments as to why demilitarized zone should pass north of Kaesong including UNC withdrawal from other areas and islands, Communists occupation Kaesong by default and provision of appropriate defensive positions for Seoul area. A significant statement by Lee was ‘especially we hope you will give up your demand for the Kaesong area. This will contribute to our progress and is the key point to the solution of our problem’. At afternoon session after short sparring [Page 1077] period, Lee read a carefully prepared speech the first part of which vehemently criticized the UNC sub-delegation attitude and the UNC proposal. He stated that the UNC proposal was absolutely unacceptable and defended their original proposal. As the closing part of his statement he submitted a new proposal to the effect that both sides withdraw 2 kilometers from the adjusted line of contact. Copy of accompanying map is forwarded under separate cover. Median line of their proposed 4 kilometer zone, which is actually slightly south of line of contact, follows: BS 9484—BS 9690—BS 9696—BT 9502—CT 0006—CT 1112—CT 1516—CT 1923—CT 2527—CT 3236—CT 4140—CT 4942—CT 5642—CT 6539—CT 7039—CT 7641—CT 8739—CT 9641—DT 0042—DT 0642—DT 1243—DT 1844—DT 2346—DT 2949—DT 3553—DT 3956—DT 4360—DT 4963. Under Communist proposal the demilitarized zone is subject to changes in line of contact before signing of armistice. The statement referred to minor adjustments based on terrain. It is not yet clear whether these adjustments are incorporated in given line or whether they are open to discussion. Since Communist zone is based on their version of the line of contact, UNC tactics for tomorrow are:
- (1)
- To get agreement on line of contact and,
- (2)
- To determine by adjustments how close we can bring the Communist proposal to the UNC proposal.
At meeting of liaison officers during recess Chang turned over to Kinney the 11 year old child previously requested by UNC, claiming child was ROK espionage agent. Chang also announced southward movement of Communist troops to Sach-On River in vicinity Pan Mun Jom. Chang complained that UNC troops in vicinity of confererence site area were shooting at Communist troops near, but outside conference area. Kinney merely noted statements of Chang. Signed Joy.”