Office of the Historian

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 33: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

secret
operational immediate
Tokyo, 26 October 1951—6:55 p. m.

C–55922. HNC 392. “Following is summary of sub-delegation meeting. Opened 1100. Lee stated UNC proposal was step forward but raised following objections:

(1) Proposed military demarcation line (he assumed center of zone presented) lies almost entirely north of the line of contact and within Communist positions;

(2) UNC would withdraw only on the east coast and slightly in area of Kumsong;

(3) Communists would withdraw 1500 square kilometers while UNC would withdraw only 600 square kilometers. Strong objection was voiced to proposed Communist withdrawal in Kaesong area.

Lee then presented Communist proposal on a map. Proposed line of demarcation is as follows:

Wolchon-Ni XC 8707—Tongo-Ri XC 9605—YC 2106—YC 3607—Chongdan YC 5806—Yonan BX 5198—BS 7699—Sangdo-Ri BS 8692—BT 9402—Chirung-Dong CT 0406 (where Communists claim their demarcation line crosses line of contact)—Korangpo-Ri CT 1106—Pokchu-San CT 6929—Sanyang-Ni CT 8329—Imdang-Ni DT 1728—Sohwari DT 3134—Kojin-Ni DT 5255.

UNC would withdraw to line of demarcation east of point where that line crosses line of contact. Communists would withdraw to line of demarcation west of same point. Where proposed line of demarcation crosses line of contact both sides would withdraw five kilometers. [Page 1066] Area evacuated would be demilitarized with each side responsible for civil administration in area evacuated by it.

Discussion of the relative merits followed during which it was apparent that there was basic disagreement as to the actual location of the line of contact. Hodes rejected Communist proposal and pointed out it would require UNC to withdraw relatively great distances along about 95 percent of the battle line and that Communist withdrawal on the west would not really be a withdrawal. Both Lee and Hsieh talked of ‘concessions’ offered by the Communists and suggested recess until tomorrow at 1100 hours in order to give us time to study their proposal. We suggested they meanwhile verify the actual line of contact and study our proposal further.

The sub-delegation procedure for 27 Oct is planned as follows: First, again strongly refute and reject Communist proposal outlining all reasons therefore; second, attempt to get agreement on line of contact; third, repeatedly suggest acceptance of our proposal of 25 Oct. (We are prepared to sit on this proposal as long as it is deemed advisable.)”1

  1. The reply to this message was transmitted to General Ridgway on October 26 in telegram JOS 85254 and read as follows: “From JCS.

    “1. We concur in procedure outlined in last para your C 55922. Suggest particular care, however, to avoid prolonging argument to point of rigid commitment by Communists or you against acceptance of any compromise with respect to the two lines now proposed.

    “2. Would also seem important that press treatment should not be such as to make it more difficult for us finally to settle on a compromise position.” (Black Book, Tab 34)

    This reply had been discussed and approved at the State-JCS meeting on the morning of October 26; the second paragraph was suggested by Mr. Rusk and drafted by Mr. Nitze (Lot 64D563, Box 728).

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