795.00/10–2651

Memorandum of Conversation, by Elizabeth A, Brown of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs

[Extract]
secret

Subject: Briefing of Foreign Government Representatives on Korea

Participants: Australia —Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
Belgium —Mr. Rothschild, Counselor
Canada —Mr. Campbell, Second Secretary
Colombia —Absent
Ethiopia —Mr. Tesemma, First Secretary
France —Mr. Millet, Counselor
Great Britain —Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor
Greece —Mr. Kalergis, Minister Counselor
Korea —Absent
Luxembourg —Absent
Netherlands —Dr. de Beus, Minister Plenipotentiary
Mr. van Boetzelaer, First Secretary
New Zealand —Mr. Wade, First Secretary
Philippines —Mr. Gamboa, Counselor
Thailand —Mr. Charat, Second Secretary
Turkey —Mr. Esenbel, Counselor
Union of South Africa —Mr. Jarvie, Counselor
United States FE, Mr. Rusk
EUR, Mr. Allen
UNP, Mr. Henkin
UNP, Miss Brown
UNA, Mr. Bloomfield
R, Mr. Furnas
FE, Mr. Hackler
FE, Mr. Barbour
Army, Captain Hooks

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Mr. Rusk pointed out that we had been giving considerable thought to the next point on the agenda dealing with inspection. We had felt that any cease-fire would be precarious unless there were sufficient provisions for inspection on both sides to insure the respective forces against sudden, surprise attacks. Previously, the idea of a full and free inspection had been prominent. Despite the fact that we were not keen on the idea of having mixed military observation teams behind our own lines, we had felt we probably would be obliged to accept such an arrangement in order to obtain access to North Korea. Our consideration of the inspection problem at this point inclined toward the view that unlimited inspection rights throughout Korea would not be required and that it might be possible to work out selective types of inspection at key points which would give the opposing [Page 1065] commanders adequate insurance against any surprise onslaught. More extensive inspection than absolutely necessary might create more difficulties for us than benefits, both in reaching agreement and in providing a source of incidents. We hoped an inspection plan could be devised which would give reasonable assurances against the types of onslaught which would threaten the security of UN forces as a whole. Mr. Rusk stressed the secrecy of our thinking on this point.

Mr. Rusk thought that the prisoners of war question would be very troublesome. The difficulty inherent in this problem illustrated that even if considerable headway were made in the truce negotiations on the demarcation line and on inspection, there would not be any reason for great optimism.

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