795.00/9–2651
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)
Subject: Korea
| Participants: | Defense: General Omar Bradley, Chairman, JCS |
| Admiral William Fechteler, Chief of Naval Operations | |
| General Hull | |
| General Joseph Smith, Dept. of the Air Force | |
| State: Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor | |
| Mr. Paul Nitze, Director, Policy Planning Staff | |
| Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Acting Dep. Asst. Secretary, FE | |
| Mr. John Ferguson, S/P | |
| Mr. Charles Stelle, S/P |
General Bradley read portions of a personal “eyes only” message1 which he had just received from General Ridgway, in which he indicated that as we had up to now in effect conceded virtually all procedural issues to the other side he felt that it would be impossible for us to return to Kaesong. Therefore, in order that he could conduct his present negotiations over the site with confidence and with full assurances on this point, General Ridgway was asking General Bradley to obtain the assurances of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he would [Page 1000] not at any time in the future be overruled and directed to return to Kaesong.
General Bradley indicated that he was of the belief that we should not be placed in the position of having definitively broken off negotiations solely on the question of Kaesong and suggested that the Army study the possibility of our proposing to the Communists that we move some of our forces up to the southern perimeter of the Kaesong neutralized area (to be withdrawn to their original positions upon the conclusion of the armistice talks). It was General Bradley’s thought that this would be consistent with our proposal for a meeting place between the lines with equal access to both sides and might provide the basis for agreement if the Communists continue to be adamant in their insistence upon Kaesong. With the agreement of those present, General Bradley indicated that he would reply personally to General Ridgway’s message assuring him that there was no disposition in the Government to change his present instructions with regard to the site of the talks or to order him to return to Kaesong, but at the same time indicating that we did not now deem it necessary or desirable to take the position that at no time and under no circumstances would we ever return to Kaesong. General Bradley also indicated that he intended to reaffirm to General Ridgway our thought on the importance of not being placed in the position of having broken off the talks solely on the issue of return to Kaesong and placing the emphasis upon our willingness to meet with the Communists at any suitable site thereby placing on them any onus of breaking on the issue of Kaesong.
General Bradley showed the group a map illustrating the 4-kilometer demilitarized zone proposal which General Ridgway has been authorized to make at a suitable occasion, the Kansas line, the present line of contact, and the objectives of the present limited offensive in the west central sector of the front.
There was some general discussion of the present military situation from which it appeared that the concensus was that the UN military position was very strong and therefore there was no immediate urgency for concluding the armistice talks.
The Joint Chiefs stated that they had received a message2 from General Ridgway with respect to the necessity for inspection of Communist-held areas after armistice agreement, in which General Ridgway had indicated his belief that it was not essential that we have the right throughout all of North Korea. However, from the discussion it appeared that General Ridgway may consider that a minimum position on this point should include some manner of inspection [Page 1001] spection of designated airfields and ports of entry into North Korea. The Joint Chiefs stated that, based on General Ridgway’s recommendations, they were having a study of this subject immediately undertaken.
There was some inconclusive discussion of the prisoners of war problem, including the problem of North Korean prisoners held by us whose homes were in South Korea, and the considerable number of Chinese prisoners who were said to be strongly opposed to being returned to Communist hands. A suggestion was made but not discussed that a solution might be release in the demilitarized zone of prisoners held by both sides so that the prisoners could opt which way they wanted to go.
Admiral Fechteler stated that he had just received figures indicating that from January through July, 1951, there have been some seven million tons of shipping (1,240 vessels) entered in Chinese Communist ports. He said these vessels were principally flying Panamanian and British flags. He indicated his belief that if this shipping were stopped by a naval blockade the Chinese could be persuaded quickly to conclude the armistice negotiations on terms acceptable to us. In response to questions, he indicated that he was thinking in terms of a genuine naval blockade of all Chinese ports except Port Arthur and Dairen to be enforced against all vessels, including those of the Soviet Union, and that sufficient naval strength to carry this out was available. The State Department representatives stated that this problem was principally one of UK attitudes, that no decisive action of this nature could be expected of the UK until after the general election and that the question had to be considered in relation to the Iranian problem.