Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 117: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

secret   priority

Tokyo, 4 October 1951—7:20 p. m.

C–52227. Urmsg JCS 95354, 30 June. Subj is Armistice Negotiations in Korea. This message in 7 parts.

Part 1. Reference message requires that terms of Armistice agreement provide for free and unlimited access to whole of Korea by armistice commission and teams of observers who must be empowered to inspect to insure that terms of armistice are carried out.

Part 2. Reference message also requires that the armistice agreements must contain stipulations restricting troop reinforcement and supply build-up. It is my feeling that this is of major importance and an armistice agreement should not be concluded without these stipulations. With this as a basis, UNC insistence on inspection is reasonable and consistent. However, I believe a clarification is required regarding the degree of inspection which the UNC must insist upon.

Part 3. Studies prepared here for determination of UNC courses of action for future discussions with the Communists regarding inspection conclude that:

a. The JCS directive regarding free and unlimited access to the whole of Korea and the right of inspection to insure armistice terms are being carried out, can be interpreted as requiring the UNC to seek agreement to “unlimited inspection.”

b. In the strict definition of the term, “unlimited inspection” is neither necessary nor desirable from our point of view. In essence, what we want is sufficient freedom of access and right of inspection in areas outside the demilitarized zone to insure that there is no build-up of troops or supplies in such significant quantities as would, if continued, substantially impair the security of the United Nations Forces, as that security existed when the armistice became effective. The foregoing would include, but not be limited to, observation teams at selected ground, sea and air ports of entry. The right of unlimited inspection of any unit, facility or relatively small area would not be vital to the security of the United Nations Command, nor would it be in our interest to accord the Communists such right with respect to our own forces. Such detailed inspection would multiply serious causes for friction and recrimination with no comparable gain. In the hands of Communist personnel, the right of “unlimited inspection” would be exploited to a wholly unacceptable degree in the intelligence field.

Part 4. Communist views on inspection principle, as brought out in discussions to date, are that good faith alone is sufficient security guarantee for both sides; however, they have indicated a willingess to accept inspection of the demilitarized zone regardless of its width.

Part 5. Communists have consistently resisted observation or inspection of their activities in territory under their direct control. They can be expected to prolong negotiations and may even be prepared to break them off if UNC insists upon unlimited inspection. Depending on the agreement reached on agenda item 2, the UNC may find it desirable to accept less than the ideal solution on inspection unless the UNC is authorized to break negotiations on this point. If this is not the case, it might be desirable to consider alternate positions on inspection.

Part 6. The UNC delegation will be aided throughout the negotiations if it is advised now of any likely change of your views. In my view, the minimum rights of inspection consistent with reasonably safeguarding the security of our forces would be about as follows:

Initial position.

a. Observation by joint observer teams at ground, sea and air ports of entry and communication centers throughout all of Korea as mutually agreed to by the 2 delegations together with freedom of movements for the above teams over principle lines of communication throughout all of Korea.

b. Joint aerial observation and photo reconnaissance over all of Korea.

c. Complete joint observation of demilitarized zone.

Final position. Identical with my initial position except for the omission of joint aerial observation and photo reconnaissance over all of Korea.

Part 7. This matter has been discussed informally with General Bradley and Mr. Bohlen, who concur that this matter should be given immediate study. I recommend you review that part of reference directive pertaining to free and unlimited access to the whole of Korea. Request your guidance.¹

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the following reply in telegram JCS 83302, October 5:

   “From JCS.

   “Reur C 52227. JCS agree in principle that clarification of your instructions re inspection is in order; however, are undertaking review of same before making complete reply. Any additional views you may have on this matter would be appreciated.” (Black Book, Tab 123)

   General Ridgway responded on the following day, October 6, in telegram C–52373, saying that he appreciated the attention given to the problem but had no further recommendation at this time (Black Book, Tab 124).

   Subsequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the following message in telegram JCS 84817, October 23:

   “From JCS. JCS agree that references in JCS 95354 to ‘Free and unlimited access to the whole of Korea’ might be interpreted as ‘Unlimited inspection’ and that in strict definition of term, unlimited inspection is neither necessary nor desirable from our point of view. Therefore, your initial position as expressed in Part 6 of C 52227 regarding minimum rights of inspection is approved. Modification of this position will require decision here based on situation as negotiations develop.” (Black Book, Tab D) See also telegram Def–88059, November 26, p. 1184.