795.00/10–451
Memorandum by the Counselor (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State
Subject: Report on trip to Japan and Korea with General Bradley
The following report will deal only with the high points of particular interest in my trip with General Bradley to Tokyo and Korea and will not attempt in detailed fashion to cover everything we saw and did while in the Far East.*
During this trip we had three full days of conferences with General Ridgway, members of his staff, and Admiral Joy and General Craigie, the chief UN negotiators in the truce talks. These conversations covered every aspect of the military intelligence and political situation in Korea with, of course, particular reference to the present status of the truce talks. The trip also involved a two-day visit to Korea during which we visited the entire front, every corps headquarters, and met with every divisional and UN contingent commander, with extensive briefings on every aspect of the military situation in the Eighth Army headquarters at Seoul. I accompanied General Bradley to all of these military meetings and would like to make recognition of the complete frankness with which the U.S. military in Japan and Korea made available to me all the information at their disposal and permitted me to participate in all the briefings given General Bradley.
[Page 991]I. The Military Situation
1. Even before our visit to the front in Korea it became apparent that the military situation of the UN forces in Korea was considerably more favorable than we had obtained from the daily briefings. Certainly I and, to a lesser extent, General Bradley had left Washington with the feeling that the enemy had benefited more than the UN forces from the lull caused by the truce negotiations and therefore there was real urgency in (a) obtaining an armistice on acceptable terms as soon as possible, or (b) finding out as quickly as possible whether the Communists definitely did or did not desire an armistice. Both in General Ridgway’s headquarters and, more particularly, in the Eighth Army and along the front we found complete confidence in the military capabilities and position of the UN forces. From General Van Fleet down to each divisional commander complete confidence was expressed in the ability of the UN forces to throw back with heavy losses any all-out offensive that the Communists might launch against our present positions. While it was admitted that the Communists (particularly the Chinese) had in reserve sufficient troops and had built up sufficient logistic support during the armistice talks to mount and sustain a major offensive, there was confidence bordering on absolute certainty that any such offensive was doomed to bloody failure due to (1) the present defensive strength of the UN line, and (2) the measures which had been undertaken by the UN command during the same period in the matters of supply, fortifications, etc.
The morale and state of training of the UN forces appeared to be extremely high and General Bradley told me he had rarely seen combat forces in better shape from every point of view. Another encouraging factor was the evident success of the ROK training program. The officers responsible for this training were very emphatic in their statements that the ROK divisions were developing extremely satisfactorily into first-class fighting units. There is still a shortage of competent officers, but these intensive training programs are gradually overcoming this deficiency. On the front itself, the local UN commanders likewise rated the fighting ability of the ROK divisions in the line very high.
2. In general discussions in Korea, particularly with Ambassador Muccio, it appeared that there is considerable evidence concerning the very serious, if not desperate, situation in North Korea. Some refugees are still trickling over and almost without exception they are in an advanced state of malnutrition and bring reports of serious economic difficulties, food shortages and great lack, both in Army and civilian population, of adequate clothing for winter. The UN troops are already well supplied with essential winter clothing and will be [Page 992] fully supplied by the time the cold weather sets in whereas in North Korea and in the enemy armies there is considerable information that they will have an extremely hard time when the cold weather begins.
3. The only dark spot which relates to the future is, of course, in the air situation and particularly the steady buildup of MIGs at the Manchurian bases along the Yalu River. Up to the present time this MIG buildup has not interfered in any appreciable fashion with the air bombardment of North Korea, particularly the interdiction program on lines of communication which since August 15th has been on a carefully planned consistent basis.
In regard to the air, concern is felt not in the possibility of a massive air attack on the front lines to take away command of the air over the battlefront, but rather in the increasing weight of MIGs which is being brought to bear on our fighter screen protecting the B–26s carrying out the interdiction bombing on rail and road communications. As the MIG buildup continues, a point might arrive when there would be sufficient MIGs to engage our fighter screen and still have adequate force to attack our bombers. Up to the present this has not occurred and the 5th Air Force is still able to keep the North Korean airfields unoperational for MIGs through daily bombing.
The chief request made of General Bradley by the U.S. military in Korea was for an increase in air strength—specifically, one additional wing of B–26s to intensify effectiveness of the interdiction program and additional F–86s to counter the MIG buildup.
To sum up, except for this one concern for the future in regard to buildup of MIG strength, the military situation in Korea is extremely favorable for the UN. There were numerous indications that the position of the enemy on the ground was deteriorating; although having ultimate capabilities of a large-scale offensive, his activities in the past three months had been entirely defensive.
II. Truce Talks
I believe that our visit out there was very helpful to General Ridgway and his negotiators. Their chief concern was that due to political pressures in Washington they might be forced to take positions which in their eyes would amount to a surrender to Communist pressure, particularly in the matter of returning to Kaesong. (The issue concerning site had already been fully joined before we got there and General Ridgway had already been authorized from Washington to suggest an alternate site to Kaesong. While I felt and still do that this was an artificial issue, nevertheless, having been raised, there could be no question of forcing General Ridgway to return to that site [Page 993] under present conditions. Therefore, in our discussions in Tokyo, since this was already a fait accompli, we did not argue the point.)
We were successful, without any great difficulty, in getting General Ridgway’s full concurrence to the next substantive proposal in the event that negotiations were resumed or even for possible submission by letter in the event that no further meetings took place. This is, in essence, the proposal we made by cable to which General Ridgway had objected, namely, that rather than start the negotiations on the basis of the previous position concerning the demilitarized zone, we would put forth a new proposal suggesting as the median line roughly the present battle line with a 4 kilometer neutral zone on either side. As matters stand, this is the proposal which will be made immediately upon the resumption of negotiations.
We found that General Ridgway and his negotiators felt they had made steady concessions to the Communists on procedural matters and had thus possibly created an appearance of weakness which the military situation did not justify. General Bradley and I tried to convince General Ridgway that this was not the impression in the United States and world public opinion. He felt this very strongly and I do not believe we fully dissuaded him.
The chief concern we feel in regard to the negotiations is that the question of site may turn out to be so difficult to resolve, in view of the issue of prestige and face which it has raised on both sides, as to be the cause of another suspension of talks. Since our return, the JCS have been considering a proposal that Kaesong should in fact be physically turned into a point half-way between the existing battle lines which would then satisfy the chief requirement of General Ridgway, with which we are in agreement, that the meeting-place should be equally accessible to both sides and assure equality of rights. If this should be turned down, there remains the possibility of having our new substantive proposal transmitted direct from General Ridgway by letter to Kim Il Sung.
My general impression (with the one qualification re MIG buildup) is that the present military situation is more favorable to the UN than to the enemy and that it could continue through this winter with greater disadvantage to the enemy. There would therefore appear to be no great need to hurry the talks and, indeed, the military situation would justify stringing them out, even in endless debate as to site. A complete breakdown in General Bradley’s view would lead to a strong demand from American public opinion for some major military development which the situation from the purely military point of view does not require and justify. It would therefore be my recommendation that we continue to attempt to achieve an armistice on acceptable [Page 994] terms; although there is no great urgency to do so quickly, we should, if possible, avoid a complete breakdown. The continued loss of American lives, although low in terms of military operations, nevertheless, is a very important factor for the early conclusion of an armistice.
- In this report I have not covered such specific subjects as General Ridgway’s views on “hot pursuit” or inspection as one of the conditions of an armistice since these have been covered in direct messages from him following our conversations in Tokyo. [Footnote in the source text.]↩