Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

611.61/10–351: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union ¹

top secret

Washington, October 3, 1951—8 p. m.

249. ReDeptel 239 Oct 2,² you are now instructed discuss with Vyshinsky Korean armistice talks on fol basis. You should not indicate any undue sense of urgency which might be construed as an over-eagerness or weakening on our part.

You might begin by outlining your personal plans to Vyshinsky and state that before you leave Moscow for extended period you wld like take advantage opportunity discuss certain matters now causing internatl tension and standing in way improved relations between our two countries.

At present most explosive outstanding issue is Korea and armistice talks are most immed aspect that problem. Cessation fighting in Korea on mutually acceptable basis wld serve reduce tension and contribute to atmosphere in which further constructive steps might be taken toward solution other pressing internatl problems.

You shld continue that developments between UN Command and North Korean and Chi Commie negotiators are incomprehensible to US Govt; that NK and Chi Commie proposals re armistice line are inconsistent with current mil situation and with statements which Gromyko made to you upon occasion your call on him June 27 to clarify earlier statement by Malik. In that interview Gromyko explained that Sov Govt envisaged meeting opposing commands to conclude mil armistice which wld include cease fire and which wld be limited strictly mil questions and wld not involve any polit or territorial matters (Embtels 2180 and 2181 June 27).

UN Command surprised and disappointed discover that opposing negotiators kept insisting upon armistice line not strictly mil in character which introduced complicated polit and territorial issues contrary to understanding on which UN Command had entered negots and which does not conform to mil requirements for satis armistice line. To take important polit steps in mil conversations between UN Commander on one side and commanders on other professing represent something called Chi “volunteers” and a NK regime which enjoys no internatl status cannot be accepted. US Govt authorized UN Commander participate in such mil talks with thought that this wld provide Sov Govt opportunity assist bringing about armistice. This does not mean that US Govt is prepared dispose important polit matters in talks with such irregular Commie mil personnel. Polit issues of a Korean settlement must be dealt with subsequent to armistice by UN and by Govts concerned on a responsible basis.

You shld then go on say that attitude Commie bloc toward restoration peace will be tested by whether NK and Chi Commie negotiators are prepared reach armistice settlement based on purely mil factors; upon reasonable line affording measure safety armed forces both sides and upon adequate arrangements for inspection of compliance with armistice terms and for satis disposition of prisoners of war. Sov Govt must surely recognize that, as simple statement fact, breakdown armistice talks and resumption full scale fighting³ Korea wld add greatly explosive character situation and might stimulate course of events which wld be undesirable from point view both our Govts. US Govt for its part has clearly shown by its declarations and its actions that it desires end conflict Korea and prevent its spreading other areas, purposes which Sov Govt has publicly stated it shares.

This juncture you shld pause and wait for comment or retort your statements. Line taken by Vyshinsky will probably be defense Sov Govts position, of their constant striving for peace, of their noninvolvement in Korean affair and they may also point out that Malik’s speech specifically referred to 38th parallel and assert that Secy Acheson’s statement before Congressional Comite in June indicated 38th parallel acceptable basis for concluding armistice. Shld they cite statements by Malik and Secy, you shld point out again statements made by Gromyko to you June 27 and fact such armistice line involves polit and territorial questions utmost importance. You shld add that of all problems and causes tension in post war world Korean problem presents clearest immed issue. Invasion SK June 25, 1950 act naked aggression—fact understood throughout world. Very fact NK army almost succeeded reaching Pusan early stages war demonstrates clearly upon whose responsibility aggression lay. However you have no desire now enter fruitless discussion concerning what has been done; what you wish impress upon him is seriousness present impasse Korean armistice talks. It is hoped Sov Govt will act to end that NK and Chi Commie negotiators will conclude realistic armistice agreement which wld afford safety for both sides and which does not become involved with polit and territorial issues with which Govts and UN must deal.

You might then remark you assume Sov Govt receiving full and objective reports concerning developments outside Sov Union and attitude US and other states confronted by Sov policies which have proved uncompromising and not contributory solution mutual problems. Sov Govt does not need be told that other nations determined defend their own way life and independence. Measures now being taken by US and other govts increase their security are for defense and defense alone. You wish assure Sov Govt that US has no aggressive designs on USSR or anyone and we hope there may soon be restored nations of world sense confidence and security which should be conducive settlement outstanding issues embittering internatl relations. Nothing cld contribute more to this as an immed first step than successful outcome Korean armistice talks.

You shld add that without achievement armistice Korea there is little if any prospect for any real solution other problems besetting us throughout world; that armistice Korea might open up perspectives for useful discussion other measures which may be taken alleviate existing tensions. You shld conclude by stating it is earnest hope US Govt that armistice can be achieved and that Sov Govt will act to that end.

If you are pressed state what you mean concrete terms by “perspectives” you shld limit your reply to gen statement that you are not prepared this time go into concrete details or mention specific matters but you may allude to issues raised Paris mtgs Deputies and to other gen problems both inside and outside UN.

Above shld be restricted to oral comments and you shld not leave aide-mémoire with Vyshinsky.

London and Paris shld now inform Morrison and Schuman.⁴

Webb

1. A manuscript notation in the source text read: “OK H[arry] S. T[ruman].” This telegram was repeated to London as telegram 1810, to Paris as telegram 1967, and to Tokyo as telegram 538.
2. See footnote 2, p. 986.
3. Telegram 250, October 4, to Moscow, directed Ambassador Kirk to eliminate the phrase “and resumption full scale fighting” (611.61/10–451).
4. The substance of this telegram was transmitted on October 4 to the French Foreign Ministry and the British Foreign Office (telegram 2021, October 4, from Paris; telegram 1678, October 5, from London; Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tabs 116 and 120).