795.00/10–251
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)
Subject: British Comments on U.S. Policy Position if Korean Armistice Negotiations Fail.
| Participants: | Mr. F. S. Tomlinson, Counselor, British Embassy |
| Mr. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary, FE | |
| Mr. A. B. Emmons, 3rd., Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs, NA |
Mr. Tomlinson called on Mr. Rusk at 11 o’clock this morning by prior appointment. He stated that the purpose of his visit was to convey to the Department certain reactions of the British Government concerning points raised by Secretary Acheson in the bipartite and tripartite talks on U.S. views towards policy in Korea in the event that armistice negotiations fail. Mr. Tomlinson pointed out that the attached memorandum1 concerning the British position was only in the [Page 983] nature of an informal and tentative reply and was based on a telegram just received from the British Foreign Office.
After reading Mr. Tomlinson’s memorandum, Mr. Rusk made the following comments: With regard to point 2 of the memorandum, Mr. Rusk explained that our view concerning an advance to the waist of Korea envisaged the tactical military necessity of allowing General Ridgway freedom of action within reasonable limits to attack and destroy the enemy and to protect the safety of his own forces. He pointed out that it was unlikely, under present conditions, that a general advance would be militarily feasible in the face of the strong position now occupied by the Communist forces and thus he did not foresee any immediate likelihood of a general offensive which would carry the UN forces to the waist. He stressed, however, that the U.S. Government would agree concerning the desirability of a general review of the situation with the interested UN member states in the event that UN forces reach that point, either through a series of gradual tactical advances or by a weakening of Communist resistance permitting a rapid general forward displacement of UN forces. Mr. Rusk commented on the apparent inconsistency envisaged in the occurrence of a disorganization or demoralization of Communist forces without the corresponding launching of a major UN offensive which could create this effect. He also pointed out the inconsistency of allowing a gradual tactical advance to the waist against heavy resistance, while at the same time opposing a general strategic advance to the same point, should Communist military weaknesses make this possible at small cost. At this point Mr. Tomlinson asked informally whether General Ridgway’s plans involved an amphibious operation in North Korea as recently suggested by the Communist radio. Mr. Rusk replied that there was an understanding with our military authorities that if such an operation were to be undertaken there should be opportunity in advance for a review of such a plan by the State Department and consultation with the other interested UN governments. No such proposal had as yet been suggested by our military authorities, although Mr. Rusk could not say whether some such plan might not be under preliminary consideration. He then referred to the problem of drafting concrete directives to General Ridgway which would permit satisfactory military planning and, at the same time, would clearly define the political and other limitations involved in any general advance to the waist of Korea. Both Mr. Rusk and Mr. Tomlinson agreed, however, that there was very little basic divergency as between the British and American points of view on the question of a UN advance to the waist of Korea and that it was more a matter of interpretation and emphasis than of substance.
With regard to point 3 of the British memorandum, Mr. Rusk [Page 984] pointed out that the U.S. Government believed it desirable to strengthen the Japanese internal security forces without reference to any reduction or withdrawal of the U.S. garrison. He also requested Mr. Tomlinson to clarify the expression, used in the memorandum, “minimum rearming of Japanese internal security forces”, suggesting that this could be interpreted as the rearming of a minimum number of Japanese forces or the rearming of Japanese forces at a minimum level of military equipment. Mr. Tomlinson was of the opinion that the former interpretation was the correct one. Mr. Rusk then remarked that any rearmament of Japanese forces, whether as police or otherwise, would undoubtedly “provoke” Russia in the sense of constituting an annoyance and of providing a propaganda factor; he, therefore, wondered whether the British Government might not mean “provoke” in the sense of increasing the probability of the USSR taking concrete retaliatory action. Mr. Tomlinson believed that the word “provocation” was used in the latter sense.
With regard to point 7, Mr. Tomlinson indicated that there evidently had been some confusion in the mind of the Foreign Office over the exact terms of General Ridgway’s instructions and our interpretation of them. He explained that he had transmitted a further telegram to the Foreign Office in an effort to clarify this question, a copy which he showed to Mr. Rusk. The telegram made reference to three possibilities inherent in the situation as follows: (a) that there would at no time be retaliatory bombing or hot pursuit into Manchuria; (b) that no such bombing or hot pursuit would take place until there had been full consultation by General Ridgway with Washington and corresponding consultation with the other members of the United Nations contributing forces to Korea; and (c) that in the event of a massive air attack on UN forces, General Ridgway could proceed with a policy of hot pursuit and retaliatory bombing on his own initiative and without prior reference to Washington. Mr. Tomlinson further explained that the Secretary, in his discussions with Mr. Morrison, had referred to the question of a massive Communist air offensive which would place the United Nations forces in serious jeopardy and indicated that the British Government was unclear as to the interpretation of the word “jeopardy”. Mr. Rusk explained that the position of the United States on this point was that no bombing of Manchurian bases or hot pursuit should be engaged in by the Unified Command if there were no massive Communist air attack which would require the most immediate and drastic counteraction to provide the necessary security to UN forces. If circumstances permitted opportunity for prior consultation with Washington and with the other members of the United Nations contributing to the Korean military action, General Ridgway should not engage in this counteraction until such consultation had [Page 985] been carried out. Mr. Rusk therefore could say that if any opportunity were provided by the military situation to carry out the action described in point (b) we would do so, but that in an extreme emergency General Ridgway was now authorized to operate in line with point (c). Mr. Rusk furthermore disagreed with the use of the term ‘“retaliatory” bombing in the latter case, suggesting that the action would not be in the nature of retaliation, but as a counteraction based on extreme military necessity.
With regard to point 8, Mr. Rusk suggested the practical difficulty of determining clearly when the armistice talks had, in fact, been broken off, since the character of the current delaying tactics of the Communists made this a difficult determination.
Mr. Tomlinson requested Mr. Rusk’s comments on the trip of General Bradley and Mr. Bohlen to the Far East, to which Mr. Rusk replied that the trip was for the purpose of achieving a closer mutual understanding on current problems and policy with General Ridgway’s Command, pointing out that it had been several months since General Marshall had made his trip to Japan and that it was considered desirable at this stage to hold a further exchange of views. He explained that the course of the Kaesong negotiations would, among other things, be reviewed. Mr. Rusk suggested that we would receive a clearer picture of the general situation in Korea following the return of General Bradley.
As Mr. Rusk had another previous appointment at this time, he suggested to Mr. Tomlinson that the remainder of the memorandum be discussed at a later opportunity.2