Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 108: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
operational immediate
C–51981. 1. In event exchanges with Communist commanders result in agreement on a site other than Kaesong, the UNC Delegation at the first substantive session will immediately propose as the basis for discussion a 4 kilometer demilitarized zone based on the following median line. From a point at BS 5081 along the north shore of the Han River to the mouth of the Yesong River, thence north following the course of the Yesong River to BT 7209 thence northeast to CT 1719 thence northeast to CT 2223 thence northeast to Chorwon CT 4334 northeast to Kumhwa CT 6538 northeast to CT 8341 east to CT 9841 northeast to DT 3559 northeast to coast at DT 4767. This line gives us some negotiation flexibility without jeopardizing line Kansas in event Communists accept above as basis for discussion. This proposal is based on line of contact as of 26 Sep. In event this line of contact undergoes any appreciable change prior to submitting this proposal to Communists the location of the demilitarized zone will be adjusted accordingly.
2. In the event the Communists continue their present intransigent stand relative to Kaesong, but there is no indication that a break is imminent, I plan to continue pressing for a new site without categorically foreclosing on Kaesong at that time.
3. In event the Communists continue their present intransigent stand on Kaesong and in addition it is estimated they are about to break on this issue, I intend to send the following message to the Communist commanders with a map describing the proposed zone as indicated below:
“Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huai:
“Your letter to me, dated blank October 1951, acknowledges my letter to you of 27 Sep 1951, but rejects my proposal for meeting of our 2 delegations at Songhyon-Ni. I have already made clear to you my views regarding the unsuitability of Kaesong as a conference site; equality of entry and control has not been and cannot be assured there.
“I rpt that the United Nations Command has been and still remains willing to effect an honorable military armistice. Therefore, I propose that the negotiations be resumed by a meeting of the sub-delegations to discuss agenda item 2, and that it be agreed in advance by both parties to accept the attached annotated map as the basis for discussion of agenda item 2.
“You will note that this basis for discussion envisages a demilitarized [Page 982] zone generally along the present line of contact. It requires compensating withdrawals in some places and mutual withdrawals in others in order to establish the demilitarized zone.
“If you concur in the above as the basis for discussion, I propose that the armistice negotiations be resumed at a place selected by you and acceptable to us midway between the present battle lines.
“The above proposals are submitted to you in an effort to secure an early resumption of negotiations. If you accept, my liaison officers will meet with yours to discuss the new location and to arrange for the facilities required for the resumption of conference talks.”
4. Copies of my message to Kim and Peng, together with photographic copies of the map, will be issued to the press simultaneously with the release to the Communists in the event this msg is sent under conditions visualized in paragraph 3.
5. Accomplishment of above should make clear to world opinion that the UNC is prepared to establish a demilitarized zone based on the principle of mutual withdrawal from the present line of contact.
6. General Bradley and Mr Bohlen concur in courses of action recommended herein and your approval of them is requested.1
- The reply from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, contained in telegram JCS 82959, October 2, read as follows: “JCS approve courses of action outlined in your C 51981 subj to deletion of ‘in advance’ in last sentence of 2nd para of proposed msg to communist commanders.” (Black Book, Tab 109)↩