795.00/9–651

Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze)1

top secret

Memorandum for the Secretary for Possible Use in NSC Consideration of Secretary Marshall’s Memorandum of September 43

The State Department does not concur in the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in Secretary Marshall’s memorandum of September 4, 1951, for the following reasons:

1. Unless we are prepared to accept the consequences of an extension of the air action sufficient to permit of a significant reduction of Chinese air capabilities over Korea, it would appear doubtful whether [Page 884] the military advantages of the action would be sufficient to be a controlling factor.

2. It would seem doubtful whether the proposed expansion of air action over Manchuria could in fact be limited to that envisaged by the recommendation. It would seem likely that enemy countermeasures would call for further measures on our part, resulting in an extension of the fighting of an indeterminate magnitude.

3. The possible consequences of widespread air action over Manchuria (and possibly China) were testified to in considerable detail during the MacArthur hearings. It does not appear that changes in the situation since the MacArthur hearings have altered the considered judgment of these consequences as expressed in the testimony at the hearings, or that failure to achieve an armistice in Korea would in itself alter this judgment.

4. The Joint Chiefs’ recommendation does not advance considerations which would warrant a reversal of previous NSC policy that it would be unwise to accept these possible consequences unless forced to do so by the enemy.

5. Our previous discussions with the other governments with forces participating under the Unified Command have been based on the position that only in the event of massive air attacks on our forces, ships or bases from bases outside of Korea would we retaliate by attacking the bases from which the attack was launched (and then only after consultation if this were at all practicable). A breakdown in negotiations would not, under present circumstances, be understood by our allies as being a sufficient basis for reversing that position.

  1. This memorandum was forwarded to the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State under cover of a memorandum dated September 6 by Mr. Merchant which stated that it had been approved by him and by Messrs. Matthews, Jessup, and Hickerson. Mr. Merchant asked that Mr. Nitze’s memorandum be sent on to Mr. Acheson as expeditiously as possible.
  2. The drafting date given on the source text read “9/6/51”, possibly because it was forwarded with Mr. Merchant’s memorandum of September 6 mentioned in footnote 1 above.
  3. Reference is to the memorandum to the National Security Council from Secretary Marshall, p. 881.