Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 43: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)¹

secret
operational immediate

Washington, 5 September 1951—8:38 a. m.

JCS–80658. From JCS. Reur C 50115.² JCS recognize undesirability of retaining Kaesong as conference site and further recognize desirability of advancing some new proposal in a constructive effort to break current impasse. However, JCS must reiterate their views expressed in para 4 B of JCS 98713.³ Your proposal B is considered contrary to those views in that it contains the possibility of a final break in negotiations without at same time fixing clear responsibility for failure on Communists or involving an issue which would receive fullest possible support of our allies. The need for our taking no action which could be construed as leading to a final breakdown is particularly important during the critical period of Japanese peace treaty conference.

At the same time, JCS fully share your concern regarding the safety of UNC delegation. However, on balance JCS consider that your proposal A should be made at this time without the condition contained in your proposal B. Accordingly, you are authorized, at such time and in such manner as you deem appropriate, to propose a new site in which security can be reasonably guaranteed. Should this approach not produce favorable results JCS are prepared to consider your proposal to refuse further negotiations in the Kaesong area.

In advancing your proposal of a new site, JCS consider it important that it not be couched in such terms as would be interpreted as constituting an ultimatum but that it should appear as a constructive suggestion to further the attainment of a reasonable armistice. Accordingly, JCS suggest that following points might be included in your proposal:

A. UNC originally proposed a site (Danish Hospital Ship) which was removed from the area of ground contact and at which security was assured.

B. UNC accepted Communist proposal of Kaesong in good faith and under assumption that Communists were dealing in equally good faith and could insure security of conference site.

C. Now evident that Communists cannot insure security of conference site.

D. This insecurity and instability within conference site zone is of as much or more concern to UNC as to Communists.

E. Complete and thorough investigations prove conclusively that UNC forces could not have been involved in the alleged violations of the neutrality of the Kaesong area.

F. Accordingly, UNC proposes a new site, preferably named by CINCUNC, accessible to both parties, and in which security can be reasonably assured.

1. This message, which had been drafted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the Department of Defense and by Deputy Under Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews, was sent on September 4 to San Francisco for the approval of President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson who were attending the Conference on the Treaty of Peace with Japan. Their approval was received in the Department of State early on September 5. (Telegram JCS 80608, September 4, to San Francisco, and Telegram Actel 5, September 4, from San Francisco; Black Book, Tabs 41 and 42)
2. Dated September 3, p. 875.
3. Dated August 11, p. 811.